








THE MOST MEASURED UNDERSTANDING OF SPACETIME
ABSTRACT.  Newton and Einstein each in his way showed us the following: an epistemologically responsible physicist adopts the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure.  The proper way to infer a doctrine of spacetime is by a kind of measuring inference  a deduction from phenomena.  Thus it was (I argue) by an out-and-out deduction from the phenomena of inertiality (as colligated by the three laws of motion) that Newton delineated the conceptual presuppositions concerning spacetime structure that are needed before we can actually think coherently about these phenomena.  And Einstein (I argue) very much recapitulated this argument pattern, twice over in fact, recolligating the phenomena first so as to add something from the laws of electromagnetism, and then so as to add everything about gravitation, into what he understood by inertiality.  Notably, to deduce one’s theoretical conclusions from phenomena is both more cautious and more cogent than to “infer to the best explanation”.  And in the context of the development of a doctrine of spacetime, deductions from phenomena lay before us formal rather than causal understanding.  Deductions from phenomena tell us, in this context, not what things or what causes there are, but rather what our concepts should be like.  The more measured the inference is, however, the more definitively it tells us this.  For these reasons the most measured understanding of spacetime lies on a line between conventionalism and realism, between relationalism and absolutism, and indeed (as I demonstrate) between empiricism and rationalism.  Spacetime is understood as neither merely immanent in material goings-on, nor truly transcendent of them either.  In order to explain this understanding as adequately as I can and in order to remark its excellences most fully, I consider some respects in which the tertium quid between metaphysical realism and strict empiricism about spacetime is wise in the sense of practical wisdom.  The wisest understanding of spacetime illustrates, I argue, an original and fundamental connection that epistemology has with ethics.
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Is spacetime structure merely immanent in material goings-on?  Or is it transcendent of these goings-on, standing before them and in its form helping to determine their form?  Traditionally the philosophical discussions concerning the status of spacetime structure have offered us only these two alternatives.  The two alternatives of immanence versus transcendence then generate wide-ranging and nuanced debates — specifically, those of relationists versus absolutists and of conventionalists versus realists in the philosophy of space and time.  These debates about the status of spacetime have richly informed twentieth-century philosophy of science, specifically in its concern to say in a general way what commitments a scientist assumes on accepting a scientific theory.
In order, however, to gain the best vantage point upon these debates, I believe that we need rather less to follow out their details or thus think through the hugely ramified discussion of them among the philosophers, than to consider in a certain idealised way the contributions of two of the greatest practitioners of physics, Newton and Einstein.  For (abstracting from initial confusions especially in Einstein’s case) these two physicists in effect pointed out a middle ground between the immanence and transcendence conceptions.  And they thus in no small degree vitiated the philosophers’ debates.  The middle ground is epistemological and thus not apt to hypostasize spacetime, yet it is not merely immanentist about spacetime and in particular it is not verificationist.  It concerns a methodological ideal, which I shall call the “most measured understanding” of spacetime.
As regards the philosophers’ question, “what commitments does a scientist assume on accepting a scientific theory?”, I doubt whether this has a single self-consistent all-embracing general answer.  But in the specific context of spacetime theories, I shall argue that the commitments in question should neither compound ontology nor remain strictly empiricist.  These commitments square instead with a signally measured bearing about spacetime structure, that is to say, with a rare yet signal achievement of deep wisdom within a science.  In fact I shall remark some respects in which the tertium quid between metaphysical realism and strict empiricism about spacetime is ethical.  The wisest understanding of spacetime illustrates an original and fundamental connection which epistemology has with ethics.​[1]​
The problem of conventionality versus objectivity notoriously looms large in spacetime physics and I believe this echoes an entirely similar unsettlement in moral philosophy.  In fact, the interrelationship between human convention and natural lawfulness was at one time considered to be among the deepest issues of moral philosophy, and was treated with perhaps the greatest insight when philosophers (such as Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant) fully interconnected their discussions of physics and ethics.​[2]​  I think that there is some genuine understanding still to be won back from that earlier circumstance in philosophy.  Immanence and transcendence conceptions in moral philosophy concern the good rather than space and time, but the tendency of morally insightful people resembles the tendency of insightful physicists.  The tendency of morally insightful people is to find the line between understanding the good immanently and understanding it transcendently.  To reach the most measured understanding possible is  in the first instance  a moral ideal, but the same ideal can also be seen in an epistemological setting in connection with physics.
2.  MEASUREMENT AND SPACETIME.
2.1.  Measurement a deduction from phenomena.
The activity of measuring is at one and the same time both practical and theoretical: in making a measurement, we establish practically something theoretical.  Measurement is the practical activity of deducing something theoretical from a phenomenon.  For this reason, practical — that is to say, moral — philosophy, is actually relevant to the ideal of a most measured understanding in science.  Understanding itself as an ideal in science relates in important ways to practical wisdom in ethics.
2.2.  Measurement a transcendental argument.
When we deduce something theoretical from a phenomenon, the deduction in question has the form of a so-called transcendental argument: from the phenomenon A, we infer what is necessary for the very possibility of A’s obtaining as it does.  We seek to discern from A some moral about things more generally — what, broadly speaking, things needed to have been like before A could ever have obtained as it does.  Our conclusion will be the more metaphysical the greater the breadth of our consideration about necessity and possibility.  At one extreme it will concern what was conceptually necessary for the very conceptual possibility of what.  For example, when Newton effectively measured what his doctrine of spacetime structure needed to be like, in order that the phenomenon of inertiality should even be possible, he was operating at this metaphysical extreme.  At the other extreme, the relevant background  judgements concerning what is necessary for what will be so very practical, so very concerned with given, purely causal forms of necessity and possibility, that they scarcely seem to us even to be theoretical.  I shall discuss such an example fully in just a moment.
All measurements are formally transcendental, however mundane or metaphysical the conclusions reached by them may seem.  There is not a difference in kind, but only a difference in degree, between even the most metaphysical of all conclusions to be reached in science, such as Newton’s about space and time, on the one hand, and the most mundane and straightforward empirical determination by measurement, such as how long something is, on the other.  Thus it is hardly surprising that there are cases in between the extremes.  For example, when Newton reached his highly theoretical conclusions concerning the gravitational mechanics of the solar system, he did so by deducing them from phenomena, that is by making ingenious measurement inferences.  These conclusions were notably less metaphysical than were Newton’s own conclusions concerning space and time, but notably more metaphysical than a conclusion concerning say the radius of the earth, let alone one concerning the weight of a bag of apples say.
Measurements at all levels are notably fallible, even if they are at all levels the best, or most improving, form of inference that there is.  It is a practical matter to have knowledge by measurement and it is also best practice to garner such knowledge.  We can be practically wise only if we can reason skilfully and with good  empirical information concerning what is necessary for the possibility of what.
2.3.  An example of a measurement.
To advance towards some understanding of the ideal of a most measured understanding in science, it is useful to begin with a very simple example of a measurement.   If my daughter and I want to measure how tall my daughter is, we might do it as follows.  First, she slips off her shoes and stands vertically against a wall, shoulders square, head high and heels on the floor.  Then I carefully mark on the wall the height to the top of her head.  Then she steps aside and we place a measuring tape along the wall vertically from the floor to that mark.  We then read a number off the tape measure.
When we do so, we declare that she is 159 centimetres tall.  This is a theoretical conclusion.  We have deduced it from the phenomenon in front of us, that a mark that I have made on the wall coincides with a certain number on the measuring tape.  On the basis of various beliefs that my daughter and I have, we reason that it is  in the circumstances as we have contrived them to be  all things considered necessary for the very possibility of that phenomenon’s being as it is, that my daughter is in fact 159 centimetres tall.
2.4.  All measurement fallible.
This reasoning about my daughter’s height is of course fallible  both because she and I might be mistaken about the phenomenon in front of us, and more particularly because we might be mistaken somewhere in the assumptions that we have brought into our considerations about what is necessary for the possibility of what.  Because of the latter kind of difficulty, transcendental argumentation is always at least somewhat problematic.  Consequently, all measurement is fallible.
For example, my daughter and I might be mistaken in our belief that the tape measure was manufactured accurately and has not subsequently been stretched or shrunk or otherwise distorted.  If we are thus mistaken, then in a particularly simple or mundane way we are almost certainly mistaken in what we think is necessary for the possibility of the phenomenon that is in front of us.  A more interesting mistake is if we think that rather more about my daughter is necessary for the possibility of the phenomenon in front of us than in fact is necessary for this possiblity.  For example, we are likely not to have hedged around our conclusion that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall with the qualification “in the morning” (if that is when we measured her).  Or again, we are likely not to have hedged around our conclusion that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall with the qualification “in the rest frame”, i.e. the frame of reference in which my daughter and I, the wall, the tape measure etc. are all at rest rather than moving.  Tacitly we have proceeded with what are arguably rash views, that if it is necessary for the possibility of the phenomenon in front of us that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall in the morning and in the frame of reference in which she is at rest then it is necessary for the possibility of the phenomenon in front of us that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall at any time of day and in any frame of reference whatsoever.  These views are mistaken, since, as it happens, people often shrink by as much as a couple of centimetres over the course of a day, later regaining in the night by stretching in their sleep the height they lost the previous day, and moreover, in a suitably moving frame of reference, I, my daughter, the wall and the measuring tape all are “length contracted” by an amount that is appreciable if our speed in that frame is appreciable with respect to the speed of light.  It would be churlish however to place a greater weight on the fallibility of our judgement that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall than is due to it.  This measuring inference, like many others, is, as inferences go, a very cogent one.
2.5.  Mounting respect for “deductions from phenomena”.
It is only within the last three decades that philosophers of science have learned to respect the idea of deductions from phenomena and to place due emphasis on the practical activity of measurement.  For reasons that I shall address, philosophers of science had in former times concerned themselves overmuch with a relatively unintelligent guess-and-test methodology for inferring theoretical conclusions.  This methodology directed their attention overmuch to observation in science, and thus insufficiently much to the practical or experimental activity of measuring.
During the last thirty years, philosophers of science in increasing numbers have at long last accorded Newton the respect that he deserves for his claim to have deduced his theoretical conclusions from phenomena.​[3]​  Philosophers of science have at last carefully examined the pattern of Newton’s argumentation in Principia and elsewhere, and have come to appreciate Newton as a measurer extraordinaire  able to reach conclusions about the physics of the solar system, for example, with cogency comparable to my daughter’s and mine about my daughter’s height.  Even the long, involved argument in Principia for universal gravitation  perhaps the most boldly theoretical conclusion ever drawn  is such a deduction, albeit a considerably ramified one.  Many of its parts are wonderfully cogent relatively unramified deductions from phenomena  that is to say, really pure and stirling examples of clever acts of measurement.
2.6.  Newton a fine methodologist.
A still more impressive discovery about Newton from the last three decades or so is that Newton was a methodologist extraordinaire.  That is to say, he really knew not just what to do but also what he was doing.  Newton in fact had a rich and searching understanding of his method and its significance  including what was questionable about his method, what its strengths were and what its limits were.  In particular, Newton well understood the fallibility for what it is of his deductions from phenomena.  That Newton was in fact very knowing as regards methodology calls for some really full reconsideration of a number prejudices in both history and philosophy of science.
2.7.  Newton deduced his doctrine of spacetime structure from phenomena of inertiality.
The following contention about Newton’s use of his method is important for my purposes.  Newton deduced from phenomena his whole doctrine of spacetime structure.  That is to say, the views about absolute space and absolute time that Newton laid out for us at the beginning of Book I of his Principia proceed from a measurement that Newton made.  To reach the views there laid down, Newton in effect said, “let the symmetries of spacetime be no more than the symmetries of the phenomena of inertiality  otherwise it is a nonsense that there should be such phenomena”.  That is, from the phenomena of inertiality Newton deduced what (so far as he could see) is necessary concerning spacetime structure for the very possibility of such phenomena.  In this way he measured (as well as he might) what his spacetime doctrine needed to be like.
It was, as it happens, beyond Newton, given the state of mathematics in his day, to accomplish this deduction perfectly.  After all, in order to identify the truly necessary conditions concerning spacetime structure for the possibility of the phenomena of inertiality as he recognised them, Newton ought to have said (in effect): “let the symmetries of spacetime be neither more nor less than the symmetries of the phenomena of inertiality”.  The structural insight is difficult, however, and was just beyond Newton’s reach, which clarifies how we can have the symmetries in spacetime be neither more nor less than those in the phenomena of inertiality.  Because the relevant structural insight was beyond Newton, Newton was notably mistaken in his judgement about what was necessary for the possibility of what.  Newton set forth a doctrine of spacetime structure which implied in effect that the symmetries of spacetime structure are rather less than the symmetries inherent in inertial phenomena.  Newton simply could see no alternative to this.  He recognised perfectly well himself  indeed, explicitly stated as corollaries to his laws of motion  the respects in which his spacetime structure carried an excess of richness relatively to the symmetries inherent in inertial phenomena.  But he could not see how to pull back from that structure, without reaching a spacetime structure that was less rich than the phenomena required and thus would violate the necessary conditions for the very possibility of those phenomena.
2.8.  Newton’s adversaries philosophically confused.
Some of Newton’s contemporaries roundly criticised him in effect for his having advanced a doctrine of spacetime structure that was richer than the phenomena warranted.  However, Newton in fact achieved a higher methodological standard than did his contemporaries who criticised him, and by doing so achieved greater insight about spacetime structure than they ever did.  The difficulty for him was also a difficulty for them, so that no-one in that day was able to point to the actual defect in Newton’s reasoning.  His detractors, moreover, set forth doctrines of spacetime structure that were in fact disastrously less rich than they needed to be, in order for the phenomena of inertiality to be possible at all.  Newton sharply demonstrated this, for example using his thought experiment about the spinning bucket.  Not one of Newton’s adversaries replied adequately to Newton about this  an historical point that Howard Stein roundly demonstrated more than three decades ago.  So we should regard Newton as substantially having won the debates in his day that were in effect about spacetime structure.  In short, Newton had altogether the right method and was only slightly frustrated in the exercise of it.  He had a deep understanding of what he was about.  We should look to his own understanding of the status of spacetime with all due respect and attention.
2.9.  Einstein unknowingly used Newton’s method.
I believe, moreover, that Einstein  the darling of philosophers, as I am sure you are aware, and therefore by far the much more admired and studied by philosophers than Newton  himself essentially adhered to Newton’s method.  However, philosophers were until recently unaware of this, and indeed were confused by Einstein’s own proclamations about the true methodological character of Einstein’s own work.  For Einstein did not say that he adhered to Newton’s method, and in fact he said quite the opposite.  Unfortunately, and unlike Newton, Einstein was actually rather muddled in himself concerning the methodological character of his own researches.  And moreover he was not at all insightful concerning the methodological character of Newton’s researches.  Einstein never understood what Newton had meant by “deductions from phenomena”.  Einstein simply inferred from the label “deductions from phenomena” that Newton had meant a method that rendered theoretical conclusions infallible.  Einstein argued that it is impossible for science to achieve infallibility, and on this ground officially denounced the idea of “deductions from phenomena”.  Thus Einstein attacked a straw man.  Because he wanted to state his fallibilism officially, he officially committed himself to hypothetico-deductivism since that is a notably fallible method.  Yet Einstein, despite his official hypothetico-deductivism, in the actual course of his work employed always the method that would deliver the most cogent conclusions.  And for this reason he adhered (unknowingly) to Newton’s method, for that is the method that is best  provided it can be made to work at all.  Newton’s method is both far more challenging to the researcher but also (if it can be made to work) far more cogent than the method of guess and test.
To all intents and purposes, Einstein’s work within spacetime physics consists, like Newton’s, in carefully measuring what the doctrine of spacetime structure needs to be like.  The key question that exercises Einstein is Newton’s question, concerning what is necessary for the very possibility of the phenomena of inertiality being as they are.  But Einstein took a broader view than Newton of the phenomena of inertiality.  For by Einstein’s day, rather more about the physics of inertia had been learned.
In short, Einstein assembled rather more than Newton had done into his understanding of inertiality.  With the phenomena of inertiality appropriately recolligated, Einstein made Newton-style inferences concerning spacetime structure.  Of course these inferences took Einstein well beyond the understanding of spacetime structure that Newton had had.  But the method was the same.
2.10.  Einstein twice recolligated phenomena of inertiality, and twice deduced new doctrines of spacetime structure.
Whereas Newton colligated the phenomena of inertiality by his three laws of motion, Einstein was working in the context of a fully developed theory of electromagnetism and therefore right from the start had rather more than Newton’s three dynamical principles to think about.  In the decades leading up to Einstein’s work, some physicists (the proponents of the so-called “electromagnetic world picture”) had endeavoured to understand the concept of inertiality that came from Newtonian mechanics strictly in electromagnetic terms as met with in Maxwell’s theory.  That is to say, they had sought to make out how the mass or resistivity to acceleration of bodies is but an electromagnetic effect.  Despite attempts to overcome the mechanical world conception and replace it with an altogether electromagnetical one, these physicists failed to make out the mass or resistivity to acceleration of bodies as nothing but an electromagnetic effect.  Nevertheless, their work did establish that there are robust connections between electromagnetism and inertiality.  They showed experimentally, for example, that there can be an increase in the resistivity to acceleration or mass of a body precisely for electromagnetical reasons.
By appropriately broadening his view of the phenomena of inertiality to embrace their connection with electromagnetism, Einstein was led to rethink the fundamentals of kinematics.  After some struggles he found how to deduce the kinematics of special relativity theory, not from any considerable part of electromagnetic theory  for that theory was by his own lights suspect, standing in need of correction at least for the reasons that had been pointed to by Planck  but deducing it rather from a single electromagnetical phenomenon, the so-called constancy of the speed of light.  The deduction that Einstein delivered essentially gave us Minkowski’s doctrine of spacetime structure as a replacement to Newton’s, although it took three years and the independent work by Minkowski to show how theories of kinematics are aptly presented as doctrines of spacetime structure.
Of course this reconstruction skirts around many complexities of what was a bold innovation.  Bold innovations are seldom viewed at the time with the clarity with which they can best be viewed in hindsight.  But in essence, viewed in what I believe to be the best way available to us today, Einstein’s inference was as follows.  Einstein revisited the whole question of what the symmetries of spacetime should be, because his understanding of inertiality was more encompassing than Newton’s had been.  In order to hold the symmetries of spacetime to be neither more nor less than the symmetries of the phenomena of inertiality, it was necessary, Einstein realised, to consider the symmetries that are inherent in electromagnetic phenomena.  Einstein discovered a particularly pure way to attend to these symmetries when he hit upon his so-called light postulate, concerning the constancy across all frames of reference of the velocity of light.  From the light postulate, treated as a phenomenon, Einstein without any question did actually outright deduce the kinematics of special relativity theory.  For this deduction from phenomena, Einstein used as a key background theoretical constraint  that is to say, as a constraint conditioning what may be deemed necessary for the possibility of what  his principle of frame-invariance for all inertial frames, which he called “the principle of relativity”.  Using this background theoretical constraint and some geometrical reflections and very little else, it was possible for Einstein to establish as necessary for the possibility of the truth of the light postulate that special relativitistic kinematics obtain.  That is to say, Einstein measured what we must say concerning spacetime structure, using the light postulate as his phenomenonal basis for this act of measurement.
Later, Einstein recolligated inertial phenomena yet again, so as to comprehend gravity wholly as inertia.  (This, incidentally, was a move that Newton in fact might also have made had he thought of it.  Newton had actually remarked and even experimentally investigated the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass, which invites one to comprehend gravity wholly as inertia.  Elie Cartan, in the 1920s, delivered the mathematics by which Newton, within the context of his own gravitational theory, might have comprehended gravity as inertia no less surely than is possible within the context of Einstein’s “relativistic” correction of that theory.)  As is well known, this recolligation of inertial phenomena takes the following form.  Instead of treating me, for example, as presently in a nearly inertial state of motion, with a force from gravity upon me exactly compensated by the automatic electromagnetic forces pressing on my feet, I may be treated instead as in a non-inertial motion, with the automatic electromagnetic forces that are pressing on my feet accelerating me or thus nudging me from what would have been the straightest trajectory.  Proceeding in this way with all bodies whatsoever, I change what motions I regard as inertial and what not precisely so that gravity  as a force, or thus as a separate phenomenon from inertia  simply disappears.  On the basis of the thus recolligated phenomena of inertiality, Einstein deduced the doctrine of spacetime structure that is called the theory of general relativity.  This doctrine is boldly different from any earlier doctrine of spacetime structure in that it employs a inhomogeneous, non-Euclidean geometry in a way that collapses the traditional division between kinematics and dynamics.
2.11.  Einstein’s accomplishments best viewed as extensions of Newton’s.
The description that I have just given hugely simplifies upon Einstein’s own understanding of what he was up to, and hugely simplifies upon the steps Einstein took to accomplish what he did.  Complexities aside, however, I believe that the way to view Einstein’s accomplishment which best illuminates its significance and warrant is thus as an extension of Newton’s.  And that is why I uphold the description that I have just given.  
In essence my view is that philosophers of science should be willing to be charitable about method or warrant in somewhat the same way that they have chosen to be about meaning.  We say, with good purpose, that the word ‘gold’, out of the mouths of people even several centuries ago, referred to the element with atomic number 79, even though no-one then could possibly have held the relevant belief.   Of course there do have to be certain pretty robust features of their general use of the word ‘gold’ to support such a charitable construal.  It is not to the present purpose to discuss what these conditions are, but rather to remark that, provided that they are satisfied, people’s terms are best construed as deriving their meaning from ideals for thought and practice which may be much better worked out than they have managed for themselves.  An ideal which may not be well worked out until much later is actually implicated by what they do, and it conditions the meanings of what they say and are about.  As it is with meanings, so it is also with warrants, or so I believe.  I want to say that, provided some pretty robust features of actual practice suggest it, a methodological ideal may be invoked in the reconstruction of scientists’ reasoning that is at least somewhat better worked out than the scientists had managed for themselves.  Newton I believe requires no such assistance, but Einstein does, and I see no difficulty about giving it him given the robust basis there is for thinking that he genuinely deserves it.
Significantly, some of the key epistemological pronouncements by Einstein which in his own mind set him apart from Newton in fact underline the similarities in their positions.  I shall illustrate this shortly.
2.12.  Einstein officially viewed Newton as bad methodologist.
As is well known, Einstein’s official view was that Newton was a bad methodologist.  Moreover, Einstein officially held that Newton was excessive in the commitments that he assumed concerning spacetime.  Supposedly Einstein was the better epistemologist, and by dint of a superior philosophy helped sort out all the mistakes that Newton had made.  Years ago Howard Stein challenged this whole view, cogently arguing that it is riddled with confusions.  Subsequently many philosophers have worked to sort these confusions out, i.e. to capture in a well considered way the nature of Einstein’s contribution, its relation to Newton’s, why Einstein thought what he did about the nature of his and Newton’s contributions, why he was right in some respects and wrong in others, and so on.  The task has been enormous, and the earlier efforts by the philosophers who have worked on this have themselves required correction in ensuing further studies.  I shall attempt to take account just of the overall drift of this development, in what I say later concerning the development of the quest for the most measured understanding of spacetime.
3.  MEASUREMENT AND MORALS.
3.1.  Measurement values and moral values.
It interests me that measurements typically produce values, for example the value of my daughter’s height (specifically, 159 centimetres).  If, as I suggest, a measured understanding is fundamentally an practical ideal, then it might actually be no coincidence that we call what we measure a “value”.  That a measured quantity possesses its particular “value” has relation to the integrity before reason of a whole set of practices of ours.  And by comparison the practical moral “value” that an action or a thing can possess bears an actually very similar relation to the integrity before reason of a whole set of practices of ours.  You might think that I have just introduced a bad or even monstrous pun on the word ‘value’, but this is, I believe, not the case.
Consider the following.  After measuring my daughter’s height, I say, “I and my daughter have just performed an experiment  an experiment using her, this wall, this pencil, and this tape measure.  The moral of our experiment is that my daughter is 159 centimetres tall.”  This seems slightly strange but it is not a ridiculous way to talk.  The fact is that in assigning my daughter a height we have related back to my daughter a hugely encompassing way of the world.  That is to say, we really have drawn a moral  in fact, in its way a much farther-reaching moral than any that can be found in, say, your average morally exhortative cautionary tale.
3.2.  Space a vastly general ordering.
There is something vastly general concerning the world which gets set into a particular relation to my daughter by the fact of her height being 159 centimetres.  This vastly general something concerns the way that things are spaced.  That things are spaced is something we mostly take for granted.  As is well known, our taken-for-granted conceptions concerning the spatiality of all things eventually get corrected through the refinement of scientific thought.  Still, there is something very telling about our taken-for-granted conceptions concerning the spatiality of all things.  These conceptions concern truly deep-lying structure, albeit structure which we must eventually learn is not exactly as our taken-for-granted conceptions imply.
Suppose there were just five things in the universe, each of which could vary in, say, half a dozen separate respects.  In that case we would need an abstract space of thirty dimensions in order to capture the present state of the universe at any moment.  In the actual universe there are many more than five things and many of them vary in many more than half a dozen separate respects.  So there is a fantastically huge number of dimensions (arguably, continuum-many dimensions, but in any case a number that is very large) that you would need in an abstract space in order to capture the present state of the universe at any moment.  Yet there is a space of but three dimensions within which we are disposed to think is captured something like the present state of the universe at any moment.  The fact (or approximate fact) that all things, taken all together, are thus jointly spaced in but three dimensions, testifies to a vast coordination of the things that there are each to all the others.  It testifies to there being a hugely demanding general ordering of things.  (Actually, once we realise that some physical laws are second-order with respect to time, we are brought to admit that rather less than the full present state of the universe is captured at any moment in the taken-for-granted space of three dimensions.  Moreover, we learn to correct in rather esoteric ways the whole classical way of thinking about space and time that I have mentioned here.  Yet the corrected ways to think about space and time explain, as well as correct, our ordinary taken-for-granted ways. Therefore there really is a vast coordination of things each to all the others, which our ordinary taken-for-granted ways of thinking about space already begin to bring to our attention.)
3.3.  Which is the greater puzzle  the whole spatial order, or quantum mechanical non-separability?
Actually the general order to which I wish these remarks to draw our attention is perhaps not as complete as I have made out.  Consider the much discussed, seriously mystifying, quantum-mechanical correlations-at-a-distance.  One way to view these is as a seeming violation of the very order to which I have been referring.  These phenomena perhaps call upon us to relinquish the view that absolutely everything is spaced.  There may be good reason to think the correlated events not really separable, not really two.  But that violates our understanding of space as an explicate, underlying order.  It is interesting that people feel mystified by these quantum correlation phenomena, rather than mystified by the otherwise highly encompassing order that these phenomena seem to violate.  Our surprise should perhaps actually be the other way around.  For it is really a fantastic fact that almost everything is spaced.  Arguably we should rejoice that there are some niggling details that perhaps lie beyond the purview of this general order.  For maybe these details are indications at long last of where we must look for an understanding of the pervasive order we call space.  C.S. Peirce would certainly have encouraged us to view matters this way around.  Peirce argued that nothing is more mysterious than order.  Peirce believed that you are only on the path to true understanding when you show how order arises from what is without order.  (See Peirce [1892] 1966.)  Be this as it may, the reason why we are surprised not when things are spaced, to which there are scarcely any exceptions, but rather when highly exceptional phenomena defy this order, is partly that it comes to us innately to think of all things as spaced.
3.4.  Some laws of space known innately.
Our innate ways of thinking about things include the following.  If you have two pencils side by side that match one another and then you move one pencil gently through one path and the other pencil gently through another path so that ultimately you bring them back side by side again, then you expect that the two pencils again match one another.  And this particular practical happenstance is, moreover, just one special case of a wonderfully much more general pattern which you also innately expect will obtain.  To begin to appreciate more of the pattern, you need just think about similar tasks which you could perform involving three matching pencils or more.  The wondrous thing we should note about all this is not only that, as a matter of practical fact, these patterns obtain, but also that it comes really very readily to our minds to expect that these patterns will obtain  so readily, indeed, that, when the patterns are pointed out to us, we find it even rather difficult to conceive that things might not have happened this way.
And actually with work and cleverness it is possible to fetch out of ourselves many further expectations, expectations that are remarkably much conformable to the facts.  The case of pencils all alike in length is of course just a degenerate one.  We can consider other things than pencils, and other comparisons between things than when things precisely match.  We can consider for example, with respect to the spatial dispositions of things, the general description of the comparison of magnitudes that, over two and a half thousand years ago, Theaetetus and Eudoxus worked up and that Euclid summarised in the Elements.  And not only does all this mathematics that we can fetch out of ourselves work handsomely as a guide to practical actions.  Moreover, this whole guide is handsomely indifferent between “over here” and “over there”.  The Teddy bear over here of which ten would be needed end-to-end to match up with 27 pencils end-to-end, if gently transported over there relates to these pencils in an identical way.
3.5.  The moral from a measurement value.
When my daughter and I draw the conclusion that she is 159 centimetres tall, we learn how she fits into these very general patterns.  We discern something significant, in other words, about how she relates to every last other thing in the world or at least very nearly every other last thing.  That is really quite a moral for us to draw.
A key theoretical term with which we reckon to ourselves the general facts I have cursorily brought into view is ‘length’.  It is a wondrous fact about us that our minds are so formed from birth that we can readily grasp laws of geometry, or simple symmetries of the ways in general that things can be spaced, to which the use of the term ‘length’ can be linked.  Not only can we produce this link, but we can also correct or improve it as our theoretical sophistication grows.  This tells us a lot I believe about why physics is discursively as sharp as it is, and how we can progress in physics towards a carefully measured understanding of things.
3.6.  Morals harder to come by in inquiries other than physics.
Compared to physics, some other inquiries have a relatively tough time of it as sciences.  In them it is a struggle to put a value on anything, certainly not a value with searching, very nearly all-encompassing, significance.  Such acts of measurement as are possible in these other inquiries, do not deliver a very telling moral.  I will consider for a moment two other inquiries for comparison: biology and psychology.
In physics, we lay hold of already deep-lying order in the world when we make use of ideas we have innately, concerning space.  For example, we may employ a concept of length which comes to us innately.  If we “coordinate” this innate concept to the phenomena of rigid body motions, considered ideally, then we make a useful start towards reckoning to ourselves many further patterns in phenomena.  It is amazingly useful for us to coordinate our concept of length to the idealised phenomena of rigid body motions, for by doing so we greatly increase our ability to make sense of wider patterns.
Thus for example, we have discovered that electrical conductivity, e.g. of metals, is measurable.  How would I measure the conductivity of a particular metal alloy?  Notably, I do so in ways that presuppose a robust geometry of space.  One way for me to measure the conductivity of the metal alloy might be for me to apply a voltage across a sample of the alloy, a sample that has been suitably drawn into a wire of known length and known constant cross section.  That involves geometrical reckoning.  I then measure both the voltage and the current across this sample wire.  For the measurement of the voltage, I use a voltmeter, for the measurement of the current, an ammeter.  These instruments perhaps themselves involve the direct comparison of a spatial interval, e.g. deflection of a needle, with the electrical quantity they help me to measure.  Or at least it will be partly because such instruments compare well in their readings with the particular instruments that I use, that I am right to possess confidence that the instruments that I use accurately measure the respective electrical quantities.
In order that my efforts should constitute a veritable measurement of the electrical conductivity of the metal alloy, I must have a well grounded confidence that the particular instruments that I use are up and running.  On what kind of grounds will I base my confidence that my instruments are up and running, that is to say, accurate in the information they give me?  Consider the voltmeter.  Its design of course reflects theoretical understandings of one sort or another, but it is not specifically by virtue of my confidence, such as it is, in these theoretical understandings, that I adjudge the voltmeter to be up and running, i.e. reliable for the measurement of voltages.  On the contrary, the reasons why I judge it this way is richly practical.  For a start, it is, in its behaviour, notably alike to other voltmeters, including to voltmeters that are designed quite differently, some so differently as to reflect a largely separate reach of contemporary theoretical understandings.  The consilience of the many voltmeters, i.e. their robust agreement with one another, is a pretty fine indication that there is a genuine phenomenon, called voltage, which it is appropriate for me to measure, and take a theoretical interest in.
Secondly, however, there are other very immediate practical checks that confirm that the voltmeter I have in front of me accurately measures voltages.  For example, I can test it across a “D” cell, and discover that the needle, if it has one, jumps to “1.5” on the dial; or across two “D” cells in series, and discover that the needle jumps to “3” on the dial, etc.  A host of practical considerations like these can attest not only to the reliability of the instrument but also to the reality of the phenomenon it helps us measure.  A similar story can be told concerning the ammeter.
By combining the measurements of the voltage I have applied across the sample of the metal alloy, and the current, and the cross sectional area and the length, it is straightforward for me to calculate the conductivity.  That is how I measure the conductivity.  Many things, including some results of calculation, come together in a particular way, and I adjudge that it is necessary for the very possibility of them coming together that way, that the conductivity of the metal alloy be such-and-such.  For me to make such a surmise warrantably it is crucial that there are robust quantitative phenomena such as voltage and current for me to lay hold of using instruments. I then use their readings not directly, but rather via a calculation that also takes into account the length and known constant cross section of the sample, to determine the conductivity of the sample.  Thus it helps that there are deep-lying regularities concerning space to which I may appeal in my reckonings.  It helps that there are robust regularities such as Ohm’s law, for I calculate in terms of these as an important step in my measurement of the conductivity.  If there weren’t already many measurable phenomena and many mathematically fairly precise relationships between these phenomena, I would not be able to make a meaningful measurement in the way that I do.
Notably when I measure the conductivity of this particular sample of the alloy I do so under an assumption that the conductivity of any particular sample of the alloy is the conductivity that is characteristic of all possible samples.  Thus from the one case I make an immediate inference to all cases of that alloy.  Thus the result of a measurement is a theoretical claim.  I infer something theoretical in a way that employs background assumptions (many of them undoubtedly likewise theoretical) together with some empirical considerations, worked up in a practical circumstance of active experimentation.  The structure of the inference is from evidence to theory, with the added background of further theory.  The background tells me in advance what the salience will be at the level of further theory of a potential kind of empirical input, input which I must seek in a practical circumstance of my own devising.   The very fine purpose that is served by the measurement I make is dependent on a highly precise and ramified, wonderfully empirically consilient body of quantitative thought.
Now suppose that I switch to psychology or biology, and I attempt to employ there the method that has produced such rich fruits for me in physics.  What is it exactly that I am to attempt to accomplish?  Certainly I should attempt to render my concepts measurable, but note that this will be very difficult, perhaps impossible.  For to do so I should first need to discover robust quantitative phenomena, with robust quantitative interrelationships wrapping them into a highly consilient field for fruitful empirical study. Such circumstances are required if there are to be concepts that are both quantitative in character and appropriately deep-lying, i.e. truly telling about wider phenomena.  If I expect to render my concepts measurable by manufacturing some link between them and direct observation, then I have not produced any kind of meaningful resemblance with physics.  If I expect that the patterns that the results of observation produced would form theories, I have hopelessly misunderstood the circumstance from physics that I am attempting to re-create.
By contrast with physics, biology and psychology begin much less easily, and do not develop theoretically from strength to strength the way that physics does.   Let us suppose that a biologist and a psychologist are attempting to reckon in their minds the patterns to be picked out by concepts such as ‘evolutionary fitness’ and ‘intelligence’.  By developing these concepts, the biologist and the psychologist hope to find themselves better able to study many further patterns in the phenomena of their respective fields.  The vexing fact is, however, that, to the extent that there are discoverable patterns relating to ‘fitness’ or to ‘intelligence’, these patterns are enormously nuanced and unlawful.  The business of acquiring a workable concept of either fitness or intelligence involves painstakingly reckoning to oneself just how nuanced and unlawful the relevant phenomena are.  In order to develop one’s grasp of, say, the concept of intelligence, what one needs most to learn are all the ways in which various practical approaches to estimating intelligence  for example, by a score on some IQ test  are liable to mislead.  Were anyone oblivious to the ways in which a particular IQ test can fail to estimate intelligence, then this would reflect a seriously inadequate grasp by them of the concept of intelligence.  In order to have grasped this concept, one therefore needs a nuanced appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of a variety of different ways to estimate intelligence.  We are not born with any particular facility for picking up the nuanced appreciation which is needed; great effort is required in order for it to come at all.  Moreover, the difficulty for the psychologist of initially framing an adequate concept of intelligence is only half the challenge.  The challenge is compounded as the psychologist seeks to make sense in terms of this concept of other matters.  In seeking to track further patterns in phenomena, the psychologist only discovers still further reasons to qualify and compound the patterns supposed reckonable under the concept of intelligence.  It is even likely to come to seem to the psychologist that there is no single pattern, to which the concept of intelligence is aptly coordinated.  At best something multidimensional may be thought to be lurking out there, something that is in some ways best not thought of as unidimensional the way that the concept of intelligence forces us to do.  For the evolutionary biologist, the experience is similar.  Evolutionary ‘fitness’ if it is anything is something multidimensional and fraught.  The more that one knows about the living world, the less happy one will be with the very concept.
In short, psychology and biology are disciplines within which if something is simple enough to be stated, it is very likely false.  Physics often strikes us as the opposite: in physics, if something cannot be stated simply, it is very likely false.  I am attempting to make clear why there is this difference.  Physics is lucky, in how it begins with an enormously encompassing order, namely space, of which we have innately a very searching initial appreciation.
3.7.  Operationalism destructive of morals.
It is difficult to measure fitness or intelligence and it is arguably misplaced even to try.  But it is relatively easy to measure length, and to make it one’s business to do so proves useful in all sorts of further respects.  During a brief and notorious episode in the philosophy of physics, it was suggested seriously that all the theoretical concepts of physics should be operationalised, i.e., set, by stipulation, quite directly into connection with measurement operations.  Because measurement initially comes so easily in physics, it is  I suppose  almost as tempting, in physics, to think that we should operationalise the notion of ‘length’, as it is daft, in psychology, to think that we should operationalise the notion of ‘intelligence’.  But in both fields the relevant operationalist stipulation would actually spell  disaster.  Operationalism in either field is a giant backwards leap in our quest towards making theoretical sense of further patterns.
In physics, it would, in Newton’s words, “defile the purity” of those further patterns, to attempt to reach them while using some merely operational understanding of ‘length’.  For in reckoning the further patterns, physicists are liable to discover more fundamental laws.  And it is to be expected that these laws will ground reasons why we should question whether a given operation always accurately measures length after all.​[4]​  For this reason, operationalism is latently destructive of morals.  Operationalists are able to say nothing very deep or significant.  By dint of their commitment to their peculiar doctrine of meaning, everything they say is hopelessly on the surface.  There is little value in a measurement value that an operationalist sets before us for our consideration.  In short, operationalists diminish science rather than enhancing it.
To see this, consider again the concept of conductivity.  That concept is not one that I should seek to define in terms of the operations by which I can measure it, for these operations are both never-ending in variety and at the same time richly reticulate and overconnected.  Just think how many different types of voltmeter I might use, and just imagine all the different practical means there are by which I could have established that any one of these voltmeters was up and running.  Yet each of these myriad processes constitutes a possible step in a possible operation by which to measure conductivity.  In fact, precisely because the concept of conductivity is theoretical, I have no business seeking to define it, not by any initial act of stipulation in any case. Rather it will be only as my theoretical insight improves, that the sense and purpose of the concept of conductivity will become clear to me.  It is very much towards the deep-lying characteristics of the richly over-connected consilient nexus of physical quantities that my theoretical concepts should be directed.  What these come to practically is beyond possible reckoning in words.
The demand by the operationalists that concepts be operationalised or else discarded as “meaningless” is heady and inappropriate.  Despite an initial kind of appeal it may have in a relatively fortunate science such as physics, this demand is even in that kind of science the very reverse of good sense.  Meaningful concepts are the ones we cannot begin to operationalise; operationalised concepts are the ones which barely have meaning at all.
3.8.  Physics often correctively broadens the morals that it had previously drawn.
Of course, when we “coordinate” our very concept of length to the phenomena of rigid body motions, considered ideally, which I described above, we make a start which we will eventually discover stands in need of partial correction.  By thus coordinating our very concept of length, we stipulate that lengths  as we use the term  conform to the laws of Euclidean geometry.​[5]​  To stipulate in this way comes naturally to us, and leads for the longest while to no disappointments at all.  On the contrary, in so stipulating, we establish for the term ‘length’ a full-blooded connection on the one hand to practice, and on the other hand to laws, laws of which a really clear and productive theoretical apprehension is possible.
‘Length’, however innate the concept may be, is of course itself a key concept of physics.  Why this is is in the first place because the idealised phenomena of rigid body motions can be colligated under mechanical laws. These are not the fully dynamical laws of Newtonian mechanics, which concern themselves with the inertia of bodies, but rather the more restricted laws with which to comprehend why say in a system of gears when one gear moves a certain way the other gears move as they do.  Yet, in the second place, there are very many other patterns for physics to study than just those concerning the motions of rigid bodies, and it so happens that, precisely by employing the Euclidean concept of length, physicists were (for the longest while) made better able to reckon to themselves these other patterns.  It is thus amazingly useful for us to coordinate our concept of length to the idealised phenomena of rigid body motions, of which we have an innate appreciation, for by doing so we greatly increase our ability to make sense of wider patterns.
In short physicists are luckier than psychologists and biologists, because of the already searching significance there is within the magnitudes that they can straightforwardly measure, or thus the values that they can straightforwardly assign.  The full extent of this significance resides in part in further searching patterns, and thus in further magnitudes that the physicists can identify for measure, and thus further values that they can assign  or thus morals they can draw.
3.9.  Mathematics and the drawing of morals.
It is more natural to employ mathematics within the inquiry of physics than it is within biology or psychology.  This relates to the fact that in physics it is typically very much more telling to measure things than it is typically in biology or psychology.  But the link to mathematics is not just that measurements produce values for magnitudes, values for magnitudes are numbers, and numbers are mathematical.  There is a far deeper reason, connecting in quite a different way to measurement, why physics is mathematical whereas neither biology nor psychology is so much.
Possibility in mathematics is a matter concerning the rational integrity of systematic forms of thought.  We condition our mathematical judgements by considering what will give coherence to an encompassing way to think.  This is why mathematics seems to be without foundations.  Nothing is secure or certain in mathematics, for by discovering how to broaden the settings for the ideas and objects that they concern themselves with, mathematicians regularly overturn the convictions that formerly had seemed to them most certain.​[6]​  The mathematical endeavour is remarkably much a synthetic search for wisdom.  We are as little likely to find true foundations for it as we are for philosophy.
To nourish our sense of the possible in the way that mathematics does poses both opportunity and risk.  The risk is that when we render our thinking mathematical our vision may be dimmed not brightened.  This outcome is familiar to us from our experience so far in inquiries such as biology and psychology.  To render our thinking mathematical in these branches of science can be helpful at times, but it often amounts just to puff and pretension.  In that case, the mathematics we use is “artificial”.  We can talk of values and we can mess with formulas but there is scarcely a moral, properly so-called, in any of it.  For the subject matter we are investigating is simply not, to all our own intelligence at least, especially embracing.  (For example, we cannot lay hold of an embracing understanding of either fitness or intelligence.  It seems that the relevant patterns are just not there, except in fleeting and partial respects.)  In such fields of investigation, by enlisting mathematical forms of description of what we need to know about, we only dull our sense of the possible in connection with it.  
On the other hand, the opportunity from nourishing by mathematics our sense of the possible relates to the opposite circumstance.  When we render our thinking mathematical our vision may be brightened not dimmed.  In that case, the mathematics we use is “natural”.  What we need to know about in fact is, or is the tip of, something embracing.  It only makes more intelligent our sense of the possible concerning it, to approach the description of it mathematically.  Quite a lot of the experience so far of the development of physics as a science, has been of this second sort.  That is why we say it is natural to express physics mathematically.
Of course this says a lot about the qualities of physics as knowledge.  We are capable of approaching a quality of understanding in physics that is arguably more or less special to that field.  The quality in question is that of a most measured understanding of things.
3.10.  Most measured understanding an ethical ideal.
I have compared this ideal form of understanding to an ethical ideal.  Ethics is ineluctably synthetic.  It has regard like mathematics does for the integrity before reason of something encompassing, specifically an overall way of melding individual ways to act.  Values, whether measurement values or moral values, are not reducible to underlying characteristics of the world.  Unity or coherence trumps givenness in the construction of ideals.  Thus ideals are not in nature, but rather impose, from outside of nature, upon what metaphysically or morally may be said concerning it.  So, value is not just another element of the real.  Value is objective, but not a thing.  
Measurement values and moral values are objective.  We can be right or wrong in our thinking concerning them.  But they are ideal rather than material.  They proceed from conditions upon what it is for us to think both theoretically and well.​[7]​  And so they are not further elements of the real.
That a measured quantity possesses its particular “value” has relation to the integrity before reason of a whole set of practices of ours.  And by comparison the moral “value” that an action or a thing can possess bears an actually very similar relation to the integrity before reason of a whole set of practices of ours.  In both cases, objectivity comes apart from ontology.  Values do not compound ontology because they relate to ideals.
3.11.  Why spacetime a metaphysical topic.
Why spacetime is a metaphysical topic seems to me to have nothing whatsoever to do with ontology.  I believe that spacetime is a metaphysical topic for the same reason that ethics is.  Freedom, the good, natural activity, space and time  these are all key concerns of metaphysics, and are in my opinion similar to one another in not being issues about what there is.
In addressing the metaphysics of freedom, the good, natural activity, or space and time, I believe we discover such thoroughgoing linkages between the questions of what there is and of how things are, that we should actually feel discouraged from ever again asking the question what there is simpliciter.  The way towards the best possible understanding of freedom, the good, natural activity, or space and time, in my view involves accepting that they are not further elements of our situation, but rather concern somewhat elusive or variously interpretable  because utterly deep  aspects of the structure of our situation.  The quest for a most measured understanding of spacetime is like the quest for practical wisdom, and thus for thoroughgoing knowledge of what is good.  The quest presupposes that there is, all things considered, only one responsible way to think about spacetime.  Thinking that way about spacetime simply touches base with conditions on the very integrity of our whole conceptual scheme.  Of course it is difficult for us to reach such depths as these in our own actual thinking.  The idea of a most measured understanding of spacetime is hard to achieve  just as perfect knowledge in morality is likewise hard to achieve.  But, significantly, nothing about either the quest or the goal suggests that spacetime is a thing.
3.12.  A case for idealism about spacetime.
The view I thus take of spacetime is idealist.  ‘Idealism’ should in my view be parsed ‘ideal-ism’ not ‘idea-lism’.  Idealism with respect to spacetime is not the thesis that spacetime is idea-like or subjective, but rather that spacetime derives its objectivity from the form of an encompassing ideal.  In fact, idealism in the sense intended is completely compatible with materialism.  Materialism is a perfectly acceptable thesis about what there is (namely, that all that is, is material).  Idealism by comparison is a perfectly acceptable thesis that what there is neither exhausts, nor even begins, metaphysics.  The key concerns of metaphysics are not just to decide what there is.
Idealism is a tendency of rationalist philosophy, materialism a tendency of empiricist philosophy.  (Berkeley’s empiricist philosophy is one apparent exception, but its stance is notably idea-list rather than ideal-ist, and the philosophy is moreover not fully coherent in itself.  Descartes’ rationalist philosophy is perhaps also an exception, for it is despite its rationalism arguably materialist.  However, it too is not fully coherent in itself.  I believe that these exceptions help prove the rule, that for the most part, idealism is a tendency of rationalist philosophy, and materialism a tendency of empiricist philosophy.)  I believe moreover that the most successful philosophies are those, like Aristotle’s or Kant’s, which intercombine both empiricism and rationalism and idealism and materialism.  
Despite certain differences I have with Kant, I believe that the best philosophical position is “transcendental idealist”.  Recall that measurement involves “transcendental argumentation”.  The ideal of a most measured understanding thoroughly intercombines rationalism and empiricism.  This ideal is on the one hand empiricist, since it concerns how theoretical conclusions may be reached by empirical (viz. practical/experimental) means.  It is on the other hand rationalist, since every measurement involves a prior determination of what is necessary for the possibility of what.  Thus organising conceptions have a kind of priority to particular facts, and necessity and possibility to actuality: and these are trademark implications of a rationalist position.  Notably, the most measured understanding of things will always be the most rationally unified one.
3.13.  Correcting and defending “transcendental idealism”.
The more measured one’s understanding is, the more it becomes, in something like Kant’s sense of the word, transcendental.  For, what is transcendental is neither transcendent nor immanent, but is rather on the line between them.  That is why the transcendental philosophy of Kant hits the line between rationalism and empiricism.  We must recall that Kant used the word ‘transcendental’ to mean something sharply distinct from ‘transcendent’.  What is transcendental is ideal in as full a way as it can be without being transcendent.  What is transcendental conditions all that is material by standing as necessary for its very possibility.  As a condition for what is material, it is not transcendent  but as a condition on what is necessary for the possibility of what, it is not immanent either.  Transcendentalism concerns the line between immanentism and transcendentism.
Kant of course erred in his own estimation of what is transcendental about thought.  Kant held that geometry and arithmetic represent ideals that are given to us.  He believed that we know with complete certainty that Euclidean geometry and intuitive arithmetic hold  that is, are true in respect of all possible objects of our experience.  These two branches of mathematics are, he believed, given, or established, parts, of any tenable understanding of things.  In his view we have not had to grow these ideals in the creative process of seeking the most measured understanding of things.  Nor will we ever change mathematics much beyond the form it had reached in his day, despite our continuing to improve our understanding overall.  Mathematics is, in Kant’s view, for the most part fixed, thanks to its connection with givenness.  Notably, Kant insists that the “transcendental argument” by which in his “Aesthetic” he is able to produce geometry and arithmetic as conditions on our knowledge requires almost no work at all.  This contrasts with the deeply difficult, deeply philosophical “transcendental argument” which concerns Kant in his “Analytic”.  In Kant’s view, mathematics is unlike philosophy or the pursuit of wisdom, because it has connection with givenness rather than what is dynamical, creative, or therefore ethical in us.
Of course Kant was much mistaken in these views.  Mathematics actually resembles philosophy far more closely than he allowed.  As we seek an ever more measured understanding generally  i.e. an ever more encompassing but rationally perfected understanding  mathematics grows and changes.  Perhaps Kant was right to insist that something is to us given or effortlessly intuitive about Euclidean geometry and ordinary arithmetic, but this does not mean we cannot grow our thinking beyond those rational forms.  And in order to seek an ever more measured understanding of the physical world, this actually requires us, pace Kant, to grow and change our mathematics.
Empiricists have endeavoured to correct Kant by altogether rejecting the idea of the transcendental.  I believe that this is a mistake.  I believe we should retain the idea of the transcendental but reject both Kant’s belief about what is transcendental and Kant’s belief about its being possible for us to discover with certainty what this is.  I believe that the quest for a most measured understanding is the quest for what is transcendental in Kant’s sense, but that this quest is more difficult than Kant believed it to be and indeed is one that we can never finally accomplish.  In connection with our doctrine of spacetime, we can, however, come close.  And in my view, that urges us to view spacetime as neither immanent in material goings-on, nor transcendent of them either, but rather as a kind of most-general necessary condition for the very possibility of material goings-on, or thus as a formal constraint on our whole way of thinking about what is material.
There are I believe sufficient warnings in Newton’s work, against immanentism, against transcendentism, and against the view that humans may discover with certainty what is transcendental.  Newton is remarkable for having grasped both the fallibility of his own science and indeed the corrigibility of mathematics itself.  Yet Newton also knew to aim higher than empiricism allows one to aim.  He fully recognised the rationalist character of his quest for ever better measured understanding.
4.  ETHICS, PHYSICS, LOGIC.
Newton illustrated the successful use of a more cogent method than guess-and-test.  The methodological example that Newton set was of a great experimentalist, a measurer extraordinaire.  To characterise physics as hypothetico-deductive neglects Newton’s example and also the following, important, fact.  The conditions in general for cognition to take a theoretical form are not less practical than they are logical.  Rational ethics is at least as original as logic to the conditions for cognition to take a theoretical form.  There is a duality underlying all theoretical cognition, a duality between ethics and logic.  Physics epitomises this duality.  This was so before Newton  but his example only helps to underline this fact.
4.1.  Ethics, physics, logic emerged with very rise of philosophy.
We can see the duality clearly if we remind ourselves about the earliest history of philosophy (physics included).  For the rise of philosophy coincided with the formation for the first time in culture of a rationally deliberated normative ethics, physics as a considered inquiry, and the very idea of logic.  Indeed, the ancients held ethics, physics and logic to be the three main branches of philosophy, inseparable from and mutually defining of one another.  Among the ancients, philosophy supplanted mythological culture, and that was how the very idea of a physics of the world emerged for the first time.
 It remains I believe really very apt even today to view philosophy as comprising ethics, physics, and logic.  To study ethics, physics and logic together for what they are, has always been, and will always remain, a very good way to acquire the kind of wisdom after which philosophy seeks.  It has always been, and will always remain, a good way to acquire insight into ultimate conditions underlying the situation of the human cogniser.
4.2.  Ethics, logic dual conditions of theoretical cognition.
There is, I believe, a deep, original, and inescapable opposition in the circumstances of theoretical cognition.  One condition is embracing, practical, and relates to intuition; the other is focussed, discursive, and relates to calculation.  In my view, the very possibility, cognitively, of physics as a science, epitomises the duality of these two conditions.  On the one hand physics searches for the most general structures of all, is richly practically based, and must be thought (as Einstein once said) with one’s muscles.  On the other hand physics comprises some among the logically sharpest and most searching reaches of discursive theory.
4.3.  Physics epitomises this duality.
In order to explain adequately how physics is possible as a science, we need, I believe, (like the rationalists of old) to affiliate physics with ethics, no less surely than (like the twentieth-century empiricists) we at the same time examine its knowledge structures logically.  Certainly, logical analysis on its own is no way to limn the cognitive possibility of physics.
Thus I believe that hypothetico-deductivism, which is a merely logical and really very vague prescription for an inquiry, tells virtually nothing about the conditions of the possibility of physics as a science.  
4.4.  Ideal of most measured understanding addresses this duality.
By contrast, the ideal of a most measured understanding is in my view very telling about the conditions of the possibility of physics as a science.  This basically ethical ideal had already in ancient times directed people down the path towards physics.  Socrates recognised that the ethical injunction “know thyself”  seek the most measured understanding of thyself in thy situation  requires there to be deep-lying rationally apprehensible order in the world.​[8]​  Plato produced arguments that such a physics of the world must be mathematical in form, as a condition of its very ethicality.​[9]​  The ancients were not able themselves to move very far along the path towards mathematical physics, it is true.  The chief difficulty for them was that, beyond their rulers and compasses, they were (for the most part​[10]​) not inclined to engage nature practically.  They regarded the role of the inquirer to be contemplative rather than practical, and this was a powerful impediment to their development of natural science.  So, ironically, we scarcely find any emphasis in ancient times on measurement in physics.  Measuredness for the ancients remained fundamentally an ethical ideal  an ideal, it is true, that had suggested to them the very idea of a physics of the world, an ideal that argued indeed that such a physics should be mathematical, but an ideal which never during ancient times gained full expression in how the inquiry of physics was conducted.
It is often suggested that during the so-called Scientific Revolution physics finally turned its back upon ethics and that this was something progressive for it to do.  I believe that the very reverse of this is true.  In the Scientific Revolution, physics finally took on a generously practical character.  It finally made all its own the formerly purely ethical ideal of a most measured understanding of things.  In short, during the so-called Scientific Revolution, physics turned itself very much towards ethics not away from it.  Consider the fact that both theoretical ethics and theoretical physics involve deep-going analyses of agency.  In the case of the former, it is human agency or freedom; in the case of the latter, natural agency or the dynamical affections of matter.  Aristotle connected the respective analyses less well than he might have done; for while he understood well the rich practical connections for our theoretical knowledge concerning human agency and then analogised between human agency and natural agency in some ways, he understood not at all well that theoretical knowledge concerning natural agency requires rich practical connections.  Early in the seventeenth century, leading thinkers thoroughly trashed Aristotle’s conceptions, among other ways by denying that we owe ourselves any account of natural agency at all.  It is, they said, enough to have geometry: for in a mechanism it is clear by geometry alone why when one part moves the others move as they do.  This persuasion and the conception of lifeless matter that it involved was quickly shown to be deficient, however.  And the Scientific Revolution very much depended upon the reintroduction of concern for the activity of matter, that is, matter’s dynamical affections, that is to say, its agency.  Those, like Newton, who best progressed the understanding of matter on such terms sought the most measured view and consequently linked their theoretical physics to practice as Aristotle had sorely failed to do.
For really many more reasons than I remarked already in section 3, this development represented a reconciliation of philosophy’s two broad orientations: rationalism and empiricism.  The duality between rationalism and empiricism mirrors that in the ultimate circumstances of theoretical cognition.  For empiricists have generally associated reason in the first instance with logic and those who do so see little connection between reason (or rational cognition) and ethics.  Rationalists on the other hand have generally associated reason in the first instance with ethics and those who do so see logic as at best a vexed, overfocussed and unhelpfully language-oriented signature of our rationality.  For both empiricists and rationalists, physics is an intermediate case between ethics and logic.  Physics has seemed the highest vindication of yet also the greatest embarrassment to empiricism, and physics has seemed the highest vindication of yet also the greatest embarrassment to rationalism.  Only when rationalism was reconciled with empiricism, and practical reason as well as logic fully admitted as a condition on possible knowledge, could it become apparent how a science of physics is possible at all.
4.5.  Descartes exceptional rationalist, Newton exceptional empiricist.
It is noteworthy that Descartes and Newton, who were key figures in the rise of a scientific physics, came up respectively with versions of rationalism and empiricism which seem contrary to the patterns that I have just mentioned.  Both significantly focussed their philosophical attentions upon physics alone, and had not much to say explicitly about either ethics or logic.  Exceptionally, Descartes’ rationalism was not particularly at home with ethics, nor was Newton’s empiricism particularly at home with logic.  But Descartes, as can be argued on a variety of grounds, was only in a very empiricist way a rationalist, and Newton, as can be shown equally fully, was only in a very rationalist way an empiricist.  They were not as much exceptions to the patterns to which I have referred as at first they appear to be, and in so far as they were exceptions, they were, for reasons which are I believe considerable and telling, the sort which proves the rule.  They were each responding to a palpable need to bring rationalism and empiricism together, or thus to make physics out as at once practically based and yet discursively clear and impressive.
Be this as it may, Descartes rather seriously diminished, in my view, the general apprehension in philosophy of what rationalism is.  By contrast, Newton, in my view, might have profitably altered philosophers’ whole apprehension of empiricism, had it not turned out that the empiricists who followed him for the most part obliterated his insights.  In particular, no empiricist philosopher until utterly recent times has duly emphasised the practical character of the empirical conditioning of scientific knowledge.  In order to begin to see the assimilation into philosophy of Newton’s actual insights, we really must look either to philosophers such as Kant or Whewell, who were philosophically more rationalist than empiricist, or all the way down to some of the “new experimentalist” and “bootstrap-empiricist” philosophers of science of the present day.  Apart from these few thinkers, there is mostly confusion about what Newton wrought, and thus but the poorest basis for an appreciation of modernity.
4.6.  Rationalism and the priority of the practical.
Let us recall to our minds for a moment how rationalists think, for this pattern of thought is relatively unfamiliar in the present day.  Apart from exceptions like Descartes, rationalists usually regard ethics to be fundamental.  Nothing, according to these rationalists, is more defining of the world or of knowledge or more real in itself or objective than the division between ought and ought-not.  The very division between ought and ought-not is, moreover, within the purview of reason itself: what ought to be is that which has a kind of integrity before reason which what ought not to be lacks.  Of course, it is far beyond the powers of the human intellect to remark this division either completely or even altogether accurately in any of its details.  It actually is impossible in principle for us to remark this division using words.  That is to say, there is no way to render discursively how in general to remark the line between what is ethically in order and what is ethically not in order, i.e. between what we ought to do and what we ought not to do.  In short, ethics does not reduce to statable laws.  Pace a common misconception, there is not a single rationalist, Kant included, who argues that we can reduce ethics to statable laws.  On the contrary, every rationalist argues that in order for there to be meaningful language in the first place, and thus in order for it to be possible at all for people to state things, people must be capable of forms of practical rationality or thus ethicality of action which far overextend the potential of words to describe.  And about this, rationalists are surely correct.  For there has already to be very considerable rational ordering of a world before a society can exist in it at all, and of a society before language can exist in it at all.  People who can state anything at all to one another already agree in their conduct with one another on many, many things.  Consequently, it is impossible that society should first be formed by people stating to one another how in their conduct they shall all agree.  Any fully stated social accord is a good deal less complete than the actual accord. And we know for sure that it is incomplete, i.e. that there is far more to the social order than the stated accord can state.​[11]​   For otherwise there would be no such thing as the stating of it.  Thus the ideal social order cannot possibly be remarked discursively.  Ethics cannot possibly be reduced to statable laws.
Turning from ethics to physics, what will a rationalist expect to find?  Can we render discursively how in general to remark the line between what is physically in order and what is not physically in order, i.e. between what it is in accord with physics and what is not?  Can we, in short, reduce physics to statable laws?  Traditionally, rationalists did not expect so.  For, from the vantage point of the discursively expressible, the ideal of a most measured understanding is hugely demanding.  There seems little reason to expect that these demands can be met in relation to physics, when clearly these same demands cannot be met in relation to ethics.
All the ancient rationalists upheld the ideal of a most measured understanding as defining what wisdom or knowledge is.  But they also denied that the ideal can be captured discursively, and they denied that humans would in any case ever fully achieve such an ideal.
4.7.  Empiricism and discursive sharpness.
In ancient times it was empiricists rather than rationalists who argued that humans can actually achieve some knowledge.  And the empiricists naturally expected that such knowledge as can be achieved by humans will take a discursive form.  In order to defend these convictions some empiricists denied outright in effect that the ideal of a most measured understanding truly defines what wisdom or knowledge is.  Empiricists set their store by a lesser goal. 
Thus, Aristotle, for example, identified wisdom or knowledge with a seasoned and carefully regimented common sense.  Aristotle held that we are in no good position to say what wisdom or knowledge is.  But we actually are in a fair position to say how it arises and moreover that we have some, Aristotle believed.  The proper way to reflect on any part of common sense in order to regiment it and thereby ready it for comprehension together with other parts is to analyse its discursive form.  Physics, on Aristotle’s view, far from standing as an embracing or fundamental science, is but a chapter of life sciences generally.  Its principles are qualitative and indeed at least somewhat exceptionful.  There is nothing very deep about it and it is not supremely lawful.
By contrast, Plato cleaved to the high aim of a most measured understanding.  He believed that the inquiry of physics can take us deep, indeed down towards greater depths than are discursively describable.  To the extent, which is altogether limited, that we humans can achieve knowledge of physics, this will take for us a mathematical form.  On the other hand even our mathematics, because of its discursive character, is limiting of our comprehension no less than it is an aid to it.  The wisdom or knowledge for which we truly seek would be higher in its form of comprehension than words can express.
4.8.  Physics and modernity.
The modern era is defined by the ambition to be rational with respect to this world.  Moderns believe that reason can potentially prevail in a thoroughgoing way in science, politics, technology, and individual action.  Moderns want to make good on Plato’s lofty goals very much without ascending into mysticism.  In essence it aims to create rationalist utopia on this earth.  According to this hope, to produce a scientific physics would be not just to triumph over ignorance but also to liberate us from the ills, constraints and varieties of misconduct which stem from ignorance.  It would be to tackle our materiality to an extent which Plato had not himself expected was humanly possible.  The modern aim to make a science out of physics began very much subservient to the higher aim of rescuing humankind from evil and delivering humankind into the moral light.  In this way, the modern ambition to achieve a most measured understanding was  at least initially  very much ethical, even if it had the search for a mathematical physics at its core.  And amazingly, it even seemed, for a while, possible that the ambition might be fulfilled.  When Newton showed that, despite the messiness of materiality, humans can after all approach a discursively sharp, most measured understanding in physics, this was a crowning achievement in the rise of modernity.
Newton’s work was of course a triumph not only for rationalism but also for empiricism.  Unfortunately for philosophy, few philosophers have understood the duality of this triumph for what it was.  Philosophers have either been too much rationalist in their thinking to appreciate for what it is the triumph of empiricism through Newton’s accomplishment.  Or they have been too much empiricist in their thinking to appreciate for what it is the triumph of rationalism through Newton’s accomplishment.  I call Newton’s accomplishment a “triumph” even though it has had to be surmounted, for Newton, while he of course did not actually achieve the most measured understanding of things, was first to overcome a kind of pessimism about or reticience about the very aim for such.
4.9.  The Newtonian synthesis.
Moreover, Newton’s method robustly intercombines empiricism and rationalism.  To aim for the most measured view is without a doubt empiricist, for it prioritises phenomena to theory.  To aim for the most measured view is, however, also rationalist, in that it has regard for the unity of knowledge.  Strictly, an empiricist must stick to what is actual, whereas a rationalist has direct regard for what is necessary and for what is possible.  Measurement intercombines these opposing tendencies of thought.  For, as I remarked in Section 2, all measurement comprises transcendental argumentation, an inference from an actual A to whatever is necessary for the very possibility of this A.  This is half empiricist (in its regard for the actual A), and half rationalist (in its ruminations concerning the necessary and the possible concerning this A).
If Newton showed us how to combine rationalism and empiricism, then he did not really invite us to turn our backs on ethics.  For in so far as rationalism remains thus central, ethics is bound to maintain its traditional rationalist connection with physics.
4.10.  Problems with empiricism in the philosophy of physics.
Rationalists in philosophy tend to hold ethics, epistemology and metaphysics together, whereas empiricists in philosophy tend to hold them apart.  For the last one hundred years in philosophy, ethics, epistemology and metaphysics have been held apart from one another.  Empiricism has dominated in philosophy.  A principal reason why empiricism became dominant during the twentieth century is that near the start of the century it seemed suddenly necessary to people to be empiricist about science.  This was an effect among other things of the fact that Einstein and others had helped overturn Newton’s physics.  Rationalist successors of Newton such as Kant haplessly endeavoured to show that Newton’s physics is the only one possible.  When Newton’s physics was overthrown, the whole of rationalist philosophy seemed to have been disgraced.
All this is ironic however given that Newton’s aim was for the most measured understanding possible of the world about him.  For it is in the first instance rationalist to harbour this aim, and it was no small triumph for rationalism when Newton achieved significant progress towards it.  Since Newton’s successors in physics persevered with his methodology and its associated aims, even as they corrected his theories, there really was no call from their work for the wholesale abandonment of rationalism.
Be this as it may, virtually the whole of the English-speaking philosophical community for a while rejected rationalist philosophy.  Thus it was no easy thing for philosophers to achieve this century a balanced view of what Newton wrought.
Among the many factors that were conducive for the rise of empiricism early in the twentieth century were key nineteenth-century developments in logic and philosophy of mathematics.  Empiricism fosters an analytical orientation.  After some great nineteenth-century breakthroughs in mathematical analysis and logic, analytical methods generally seemed to have been given a handsome go-ahead.
4.11. Formalisation and the analytical orientation. 
Consider, for example, the work by David Hilbert, culminating in his (1899), in which he replaced Euclid’s development of geometry by one within which the inferences from axioms to theorems can all be made out as logically valid.  That is to say, Hilbert reformulated Euclidean geometry so as to make it for the first time a logical system.  The formalisation that Hilbert achieved is so complete that it raises a question mark over what if anything makes his analytical system geometrical.  Hilbert himself explained this in a way that preserved after all a link between geometry and intuition​[12]​  i.e. a synthetical link between geometry and practice.  If Hilbert was right, then despite the fact that through Hilbert’s own great effort we are able to make out as logical the rationality of the science of geometry, this science overall nevertheless has, by virtue of the intuitive meaning of its concepts, a synthetical character.  The synthetical character of Hilbert’s system of “Euclidean” geometry comes however from outside its rational form, for the rational form of this system is purely logical.  The synthetical character of Euclid’s own system of geometry by contrast resides at least partly inside its rational form, for without utterly recasting the theory there is no way to comprehend this rational form purely logically.​[13]​
During the nineteenth century, mathematicians had developed the understanding that there are alternative geometries, each capable of a comparable degree of rational integrity to any other.  It was therefore very significant when Hilbert displayed the rational form of a system of Euclidean geometry as purely logical.  This at last allowed people to understand how the various alternative geometries, with their equal integrity before reason, are even possible.  Synthetically, each is something different.  But this is rationally admissible provided that their synthetic character can be made out as coming from outside their rational form.  By accomplishing this, Hilbert showed that the alternative geometries have equal integrity before reason in the same way that two sets of sentences, each logically consistent in itself, can have equal integrity before logic even though they may be logically incompatible with one another.  Because he exported the synthetic character of geometries to the outside of their rational form we say that Hilbert formalised geometry.
Philosophers in the analytic tradition have all assumed that as it is with the alternative geometries, so it is with alternative theories generally.  It should be possible to export altogether to the outside of the rational form which our conceptions take, what is synthetical concerning them.  Indeed the view has been that “synthetic” simply means connected to something outside the purview of pure reason.  That is to say, “synthetic” simply means not conditioned merely by coherence or inner rationality, but also by “sensory evidence”.
4.12.  Difficulties with analytical orientation.
As is well known, the invitation to think evidence peripheral to a system of thought introduces many difficulties.  It is devilishly difficult to say how there could be the least logical moment to what is thus peripheral.  For my present purposes, however, the much more important point against the very idea of a sensory periphery is that this idea has insufficient regard for practice.  The common understanding of what “synthetic” means prejudices our view of experience.  It directs our attention towards what is “sensory” and to that extent away from the ineluctably practical circumstances of measurement.
This result is more or less inevitable given an analytical orientation.  Whereas synthesis has regard for the integrity before reason of something encompassing or whole, analysis must trace back ultimately to elements regarded as given.  From taking an analytical orientation to knowledge we cannot but be faced with the notion of a given, and with it, all its problems.  Analytic philosophy turns its back on rationalist ethics, for according to rationalists, ethics is all about the integrity before reason of things that are encompassing or whole.  If rationalists are right, then ethics connects with the synthetic function of reason, whereas logic is the study of the analytic function of reason.  It is no wonder that Quine’s “logical point of view” upon the sciences is both silent about ethics and committed in the end to a given.
4.13.  Analytical orientation still persists.
The logical positivists regarded all “synthetic” judgements as standing or falling not at all dependently on reason but rather altogether dependently on something external to reason, specifically the supposedly purely given character of the evidence of the senses.  And despite the failure of logical positivism, this remains very much the view that people implicitly adopt today.  Quine, despite his assault on the analytic-synthetic distinction, in the final analysis retains exactly this view.  (See Dummett 1974.)  He talks in terms of “surface irritations” instead of “sensory evidence”, and a key concern of his is to explain how “observation sentences” can be “stimulus synthetic”.  However, despite the novelties in his view, Quine regards what is synthetical about any sentence in terms of its connection via the entire “web of beliefs” ultimately to “surface irritations” i.e. physiological givens.
Of course this picture enshrines hypothetico-deductivism.  Worse, Quine’s picture enshrines hypothetico-deductive holism, the view that it is in some sense only the totality of our beliefs that we test whenever we inquire hypothetico-deductively.  This picture falls far short of explaining how it is that any cogent inferences at all are possible in physics or other sciences.  And over against it all I believe we need to set out Newton’s views about method.  Evidence is fundamentally practical, and we direct it towards very specific reaches of theory, precisely by a process of measurement.  The quest for ever more measured conceptions ever strengthens the connections between theory and practice, connections that are richer and more exacting than hypothetico-deductivism can begin to make out.  For these reasons, the quest for ever more measured conceptions in science reminds us of ethics.  Quine’s philosophy turns its back on ethics altogether, but it is made by this actually the less able adequately to reckon the cognitive character, indeed the very cognitive possibility, of physics.
4.14.  Analytical orientation promotes concern about “ontological commitments”.
Quine’s orientation to logic rather than ethics is essential to his analytical disposition.  Logic is the study of the analytical function of reason.  Analysis leads not forward to the whole but back to elements, considered as givens.  Therefore, according to Quine’s “logical point of view”, the central concern of metaphysics is ontology.  Our scientific questions are on this view bound to come back to what there is.  If we logically analyse physics in the way in which Quine suggested that we should, then “theoretical ontology” (the posits of our theory) must come out looking more fundamental to us than “theoretical ideology” (our theory’s structural commitments).​[14]​  For, logically, in order for structure to obtain, there first have to be the things to carry this structure.  Moreover, to anyone favouring logical regimentation and analysis as the main research strategy for the metaphysician, it must seem that there is a clear way to separate questions of theoretical ontology from questions of theoretical ideology.  The question what there is had better seem answerable separately from the question how things act or are.  For logically, ontology must come first and so be its own concern.
This I take it is why the logician Quine, in his singularly influential works, emphasised ontological commitment.  In Quine’s view we limn the commitments that a scientist assumes on accepting a scientific theory by logically regimenting that theory and then identifying what its posits are.  To the extent that there are difficulties about this, there correspondingly are limits on our knowledge.  In all sorts of ways however physics itself fails to co-operate with this assumption.  Physics upsets the very distinction between theoretical ontology and theoretical ideology.  Without driving us quite to scepticism, it fails to treat what there is as a more fundamental issue than the way things act or are.
4.15.  Evidence is practical.
I believe therefore that Quine’s way of characterising the commitments which a scientist assumes on accepting a scientific theory, is quite unhelpful in connection with physics.  And I believe that this mistake of Quine’s links directly with his seriously mistaken assessment of how theories in physics connect with the empirical evidence.
Quine has been in many respects a twentieth-century counterpart of Aristotle.  Aristotle understood empirical evidence as sensory rather than practical.  Like Quine, Aristotle was silent about measurement, and instead discussed the merely qualitative hypothetico-deductive link that theory can have with observation.  Moreover, like Quine, Aristotle believed that the method for metaphysics is to analyse, logically, the language of science.  This emphasis on logic led Aristotle, like Quine, to contend that the foremost concern of metaphysics is ontology.  Notoriously, Aristotle was in no good position philosophically to point the way to mathematical physics.  I believe that Quine is likewise in no good position philosophically to reckon to himself the cognitive possibility of a mathematical physics of nature.
4.16.  To measure is to know.
I have emphasised that measurement is the practical activity of deducing a theoretical conclusion from the phenomena.  The length of something is, for example, a theoretical quantity concerning that thing, since the concept of length is coordinated to theoretical laws  the laws of rigid body motion.
Clearly, measurement becomes possible at all only when we already grasp some laws.  For  logically  the deduction of something theoretical from something phenomenal requires laws as background assumptions.  There is no way to deduce a theoretical conclusion from phenomena in  so to speak  theoretical thin-air.  Measurement gets going in physics relatively quickly and easily, because in physics there are laws which the human mind quickly and readily grasps, laws which are apt for the facilitation of deductions from phenomena.  By ‘apt’ I mean that the deductions from phenomena thus facilitated introduce further telling and useful theoretical laws.​[15]​
Some people say that “to measure is to know”.  This slogan in effect champions deductions-from-phenomena methodology.​[16]​  I believe that a discipline enters upon the path of a science, precisely when it discovers a way to employ this methodology.​[17]​  Yet if it is tempting to consider that “to measure is to know”, this is not simply because of the importance of deductions-from-phenomena methodology to science.  It is I think rather because of the broader connection that there is, between the most measured understanding, and wisdom.​[18]​  I remarked earlier, for example, that morally insightful people proceed on a most measured understanding of the situation of themselves and their fellows.
It is I believe possible for the methodology of deductions from phenomena to find application even in qualitative domains, and it is for this reason possible I believe for there to be “qualitative measurements”.  This can be seen in science itself (as well as outside of it).  For example, the geologist Alfred Wegener (using only highly innocuous background assumptions​[19]​) deduced from various phenomena the qualitative conclusion that the continents had moved.  At what rate the continents had moved would eventually be deduced from paleomagnetic data (which were not available to Wegener) by theoretical considerations (which were not available to Wegener).  The more quantitative modern understanding of drift corrects Wegener in some significant respects but for the most part profoundly vindicates his leading qualitative ideas.  Thus by use of the paleomagnetic data geologists are able to push the continents back into historically ever more remote configurations and then find them touching at places and times that are just what was required by the paleobotanic, paleozoological, morainal, and other data that first convinced Wegener qualitatively of the reality of continental drift.  There are also in my view excellent examples outside of science of qualitative measurement, for example in the moral sphere, when people approach a finely measured understanding of their fellows or a finely measured course of action.  Provided that the notion of measurement is construed sufficiently broadly that the notion of “qualitative measurements” makes sense, I have considerable sympathy with the slogan, “to measure is to know”.
Physics was the first science, because it was lucky in the respects that I detailed in 3.  Physics relatively quickly and easily hit on the means to make its understandings measured.  It was in physics that inquirers first became systematic measurers, i.e. systematically inclined to link theory with practice by deductions from phenomena.
5.  NEWTON, EINSTEIN, AND THE STRUCTURE OF SPACETIME.
Newton is famous for having introduced the idea of “deductions from phenomena”, and also for having truly initiated physics as a science.  I have argued above that deductions from phenomena are crucial to science  because measuring is crucial to considered knowledge  and that physics, in particular, methodologically is in the age of Newton still.  I shall next seek to show that Einstein simply furthered the use of the measuring methodology which Newton pioneered.  As it happens, Einstein’s accomplishments did not come easily, and in the midst of his struggles it was impossible for Einstein to appreciate their similarity, methodologically, to Newton’s.  Einstein groped his way in so much more difficult theoretical circumstances towards the same systematic orientation to measurement which I attribute to Newton, that he actually never appreciated his similarity to Newton for what it was.  Yet, amazingly, Einstein’s methodology really very much was Newtonian deduction from phenomena.  (See Dorling, 1995, Earman, 1992, and Norton, 1995.  I return to this point below, especially in Section 5.11.)  This is amazing, since, through Einstein’s own work, all the laws were amended which initially made possible the forward march of measurement!  Even the old concept of length is not one which physics entertains any more, except in the so-called classical limit of its theories.
5.1.  The misleading idea of “foundations of physics”.
The general area within which a discussion falls that concerns Newton, Einstein, and the status of space and time, I suppose is “foundations of physics”.  “Foundations” is a curious label, however, and by critically examining it I think I can establish an important point, viz., that the most measured understanding in physics lies on the line between rationalism and empiricism.  It is transcendentalist rather than concerned with “foundations”.
The rubric “foundations of physics” suggests an interest in what in physics is firm and unchanging.  This is curious, for the ideas from physics which one explores when one explores “foundations”, are precisely those most apt to change, and change quite radically, from one generation of physicists to the next.
I would not say quite that the rubric “foundations of physics” is oxymoronic.  There is something about the idea of “foundations” in physics that seems correct.  Physics is not built upon shifting sand.  Or so, at least, our historical experience has taught us, during the three, or perhaps four centuries during which physics has really flourished as a science.  The whole metaphor of shifting support is not apt for physics, for in physics, movement in the “foundations” typically is not lateral, but down.
Our historical experience is that the so-called “foundations” of physics are not solid, but then neither are they shifting.  The change is always in some ways, and typically profoundly, creative, that displaces one set of “fundamental” concepts for another in theoretical physics.  On the other hand, it is not like the shifting of sand.  It is in two ways profoundly conservative, that is, conserving of that in the displaced conceptions that was formerly considered “basic” to physical thought.  First, in the three or four hundred years during which physics has really flourished as a science, physics has learned from its experience of manifold theoretical advances that it can expect a successor theory to yield its predecessor as a limiting case.  If there is one general way (about which we could have a precise philosophical theory) in which successor theories “yield” their predecessors, then I think that this resides in the general nature of measurement.  For again and again in physics older theories or implications of them, treated as phenomena, have been used for deductions to new theoretical principles which correct but also explain them.  It is clear from case-by-case inspection of the major advances of physical theory since the seventeenth century, that the way new discoveries are made ensures that predecessor theories stand to successor theories as a limiting case.
The history of spacetime theories very clearly illustrates this predecessor-successor relation.  Iron out the inhomogeneities present in the spacetimes of general relativity theory either by going to the limit of the very small, or to the limit of perfectly homogeneous mass/energy distribution, and one recovers the structure of special relativity theory; let the finite invariant velocity c of special relativity theory increase without bound, and one recovers the structure of classical neoNewtonian (or “Galilean” or “Newtonian relativistic”) spacetime.  Simply add “rigging” to the spatiotemporal connection this spacetime structure involves, and you recover full Newtonian spacetime structure.
  From within the structure that each new “fundamental” theory in physics places before us, one can  one way or another  see exactly what was true, to the extent that it was true, in the basic structures set before us by the predecessor theory.  Kuhn’s I think exaggerated and misleading talk about “incommensurability” in the intertheoretic relationship is in the case of theoretical physics eminently ignorable I believe, since the extent of agreement and the exact character of the disagreement between a predecessor and a successor theory is, in all the actual cases so far, always easy to make out.  (Once again, the examples from advances in spacetime conceptions illustrate this point very clearly.)
Second, in the actual cases so far, it has always transpired that, from the vantage point of the successor theory, there is a good measure of truth, interesting truth, in the structure laid before us by the predecessor theory.  This second point is best made out in terms of the predecessor theory’s being a constraint on the form of its successor; together with other assumptions, the predecessor theory (or often simply some privileged portion of it) points to its successor within a wider class of possible theories.  That is to say, it is by a process of measurement, using the predecessor theory, that the successor theory is both discovered and warranted.
If during the last three or four hundred years our experience had rather been that movement in the “foundations” of physics was any which way, our age would have been completely different.  For in that case ours would never have been an age of science.  We would not have had reason to think possible an objective empirical way of knowing, nor made it programmatically central to our culture to demonstrate this possibility by actual scientific accomplishment.  It is a remarkable but also epoch-defining fact that measurement in physics has proved itself to work as well as it does.
I have said two things in this section so far.  First, that it is an empirically discovered, contingent fact that something in the basis of physics is definite, that is, is not shifting sand. Second, I have said that it is no easy thing to make out what this something is.  For the ideas keep changing, and changing quite radically, in terms of which one can describe what, according to physics, there fundamentally is, and the way it fundamentally is.
5.2.  Physics overcomes the a priori.
Another thing wrong with the term “foundations” is that it connotes metaphysics, and metaphysics is traditionally understood to connect to the a priori.  The traditional a prioristic projects of system-building metaphysics really were set aside right at the beginning of the 300-year history of physics that I am considering.  They were, in fact, explicitly set aside by Newton.  Newton explicitly scorned the vexing metaphysical notion of substance which was central to the projects of the system-building metaphysicians.  (Newton 1962, p. 136.)  Moreover, as is better known, Newton rejected all traditional a priori constraints on the form of an acceptable causal law.  Newton helped to set in place in physics a new, empiricist way of thinking, according to which there are a priori constraints neither on what in physics is basic, nor on the way what is basic in physics is or acts.
I am saying, then, that it best befits our experience so far of physics, to embrace a very systematic empiricism.  (I shall of course at the same time advert to my conclusion that physics has helped in key respects to show us how empiricism and rationalism can be successfully combined.)  In my view both Newton and Einstein were systematic empiricists, Newton the more remarkable of the two.  One reason Newton’s systematic empiricism is more remarkable than Einstein’s, is that Newton stood in advance of many of the developments in physics which were finally to carry the day against a prioristic conceptions of knowledge.  It is also noteworthy that in the hands of most thinkers, systematic empiricism leads to pronouncements which, though alluring, prove ultimately unworkable, a fact familiar to us all in the face of logical positivism and its failure.  Newton, remarkably, despite his systematic empiricism, was never led into the error of making unworkable pronouncements about space and time, about knowledge, truth, method, meaning, or, so far as I’ve determined, about any general or specific matter concerning his science whatsoever.  Einstein, by contrast, was from time to time (and particularly in his early years) led to make unworkable pronouncements, albeit for brief interludes only, introducing errors from which he, though not his philosophical followers, recovered.
5.3.  Systematic measurement carries its proponents to the line between empiricism and rationalism.
If it best befits our experience so far of physics to embrace a very systematic empiricism, it at the same time befits this experience to embrace a thoroughgoing rationalism.  Because the empiricism of Newton and Einstein was a practical, measuring empiricism, their method advanced knowledge always toward greater unity.  Their emphasis on measurement is on the one hand empiricist, since it concerns how a theoretical conclusion can be reached by empirical means.  It is however on the other hand rationalist, since the most measured understanding of things will always be the most unified one.  (I owe this insight, not in so many words, to Clark Glymour.  See his 1980.)
According to a rationalist, an inquiry such as physics proceeds by careful reckonings of the conceptual presuppositions of the general ways of thinking in that discipline.  Physics is the one branch of empirical science in which this rationalist image of inquiry seems remarkably apt.  In particular, what it is to reach a most measured understanding of spacetime, is actually very aptly described in these rationalist terms.  Newton and Einstein each made enormous headway in physics by endeavouring to reckon adequately to themselves the conceptual presuppositions concerning spacetime structure of the general ways of thinking in physics.
Rationalists of course allow that the careful reckoning of conceptual presuppositions can take a long time.  The dialectical task of bringing such presuppositions into the light, freeing them from confusion, and expressing them aptly, is not simply work for an idle afternoon or two.  To sort out a science properly, if it is possible at all, can take many generations of hard work by scores of even the very worthiest thinkers.  However, according to rationalists, for as long as you haven’t got a science right, then in at least some things that you say you really won’t be making coherent sense.  The way you discover your mistakes is by eliminating your muddles.  Ideas which, though once accepted, now seem to you mistaken, will seem from your present vantage point not simply false, but actually incoherent.  This contrasts with what an empiricist would expect inquiry to look like.  According to the empiricist, ideas will be abandoned when it is found from empirical investigation that they are contingently mistaken.  It is remarkable how much of the history of physics can be aptly reconstructed according to the picture which the rationalist prefers.  In my view this is precisely because physics is a pre-eminently measuring inquiry.
  Newton was an empiricist so systematic that he held even mathematics, and method itself, to be empirically based.  Yet Newton has been called a rationalist for the qualities of his rules of reasoning.  Einstein is the hero of empiricists yet himself revered the rationalist Spinoza.  Systematic measurement carries its proponents to the line between empiricism and rationalism.
5.4.  Newton’s modest methodological conception of the relation of physics to truth.
I believe that Newton points us to the best and most understandable account available of the relation of physics to truth.  It is noteworthy that in Newton’s writings the word ‘true’ labels not only such things as Euclidean geometry, the three laws of motion, and the gravitational force acting on each and every thing owing to each and every thing.  Were Newton to have restricted his employment of the term ‘true’ to these elements of his system, which have been overturned or at least fundamentally corrected by subsequent physics, we would be bound to conclude simply that Newton was overconfident in the ability of his method to yield truth.  But in fact Newton also employed the term ‘true’ to label what he himself overturned or at least fundamentally corrected within the theoretical advance of his making.  Thus for Newton it is legitimate to label ‘true’ the centrally directed, that is to say, sun-centered accelerations of the planets, the gravitational force acting on each planet owing to the sun, and indeed, Kepler’s Laws (from which the accelerations I have just mentioned, and, up to a constant factor, the forces I have just mentioned, become calculable).  We know, and we know that Newton knew, that Kepler’s Laws and the implications that by Euclidean geometry and the three laws of motion one can extract from them concerning the kinematics and dynamics of the solar system, are in agreement with Newton’s gravitational theory only in first approximation.  But this, we note, is enough, for us to see them otherwise than as shifting sand.  They remain the sort of thing that a successor theory must speak to, and explain: Newton’s confidence in his own theoretical accomplishments was only that they, too, are “true” in this sense.  Like Kepler’s Laws, Newton’s laws of motion and Newton’s law of universal gravitation contain, in the way they embrace a complex of phenomena, clues which must be heeded in the pursuit of better theories  clues that constrain the form of an acceptable successor theory.  Newton’s laws of motion and Newton’s law of universal gravitation (and for that matter, certain findings in Newton’s optics and many other findings) merit the label ‘true’ which Newton affixes to them, firstly because of the way they have been inferred, and secondly because of their suitability as the basis for further such inference.  It is to be expected that the successor theory or theories that may ultimately be inferred from these clues, will in part correct, as well as explain, the laws that embrace these clues.  The fact remains, however, that the former laws are “accurately or very nearly true”, in a sense of ‘truth’ that connects to method and is to this extent ultimately epistemological rather than metaphysical.  Verificationist, it certainly is not (unlike verificationism it avoids all ultimately unworkable claims concerning the directness with which what is true connects to experience), but epistemological it nonetheless is.  As we will see, Einstein likewise held a thoroughly epistemological, yet far from verificationist, outlook on truth.
5.5.  How even the most careful measurements can later require correction.  
Making a measurement sets nothing in stone.  We have seen that Newton realised this.  Deductions from phenomena always employ background assumptions.  Even outstandingly careful deductions from phenomena may employ background assumptions which, later, prove in need of correction.  Newton, for example, used as background assumptions in many of his deductions from phenomena the laws of Euclidean geometry and his three axioms of motion.  For example, in light of these background assumptions, he showed how to use Kepler’s laws, taken as phenomena, to measure what forces there must be acting upon the planets.  Yet it would ultimately prove problematic whether it really is apt thus to write Euclidean geometry onto the heavens, and it would also prove problematic whether Newton’s axioms of motion are exactly true.  It would ultimately prove questionable whether, in order for the planets to fall about the sun and one another as they do, there really need to be any forces acting on the planets at all.  So the background assumptions for deductions from phenomena can themselves prove to need correction, as can also, therefore, the conclusions that are drawn by deductions from phenomena.  Moreover, even the most careful inquirers can sometimes err in the very colligation of phenomena.  That is to say, it is possible to regard things as phenomena when they are not.  For example, we face a choice whether to colligate the phenomena of inertiality so as to separate inertia and gravity, or rather so that gravity is inertia.  Newton deduced various theoretical conclusions of his under a colligation of inertial and gravitational phenomena as separate from one another.  He might have colligated them together and reached significantly different conclusions  as the mathematician Elie Cartan later showed.
It is however quite utterly rare for physicists to find themselves face-to-face with two truly practicable conflicting options about how to colligate phenomena.  The case above-mentioned about the phenomena of inertiality and gravitation, is a very unusual one.  Why it is that generally really only one option is practicable about how to colligate phenomena is much under study these days by those philosophers of science who emphasise experiment, and concern themselves with the ways in which experimentation has a practical “life of its own”.  (See the referenced works by Hacking, Cartwright, Franklin, Galison.)  It is noteworthy that these “new experimentalists” in the philosophy of science see “bootstrap” or “deduction from phenomena” methodology at work at lower and lower levels theoretically.  Using the distinction (see Bogen and Woodward, 1988) between ‘data’ and ‘phenomena’, we can extrapolate from their findings to suggest in the following way that bootstrapping works as it were all the way down.  The data which  viewed from one level up  can be colligated as a single phenomenon, are themselves phenomena when viewed from one level down.  And viewed from one level down, what determines that a datum obtains, i.e. is a veritable phenomenon, is that its obtaining is deducible from what lies two levels down.  Tycho’s data, for example, were phenomena at a low level of experimentation: for, to obtain his results Tycho used his instruments in such a way that he could bootstrap determine these results from what he saw.  Kepler won some higher-level phenomena from out of those initial data, phenomena which became for him data from which to win still higher-level phenomena, and so on.  Kepler’s highest-level phenomena were the data for Newton’s delineation of higher-level phenomena still, which were data for Einstein’s delineation of still higher-level phenomena.  The colligation at each new level idealises and corrects the data from the lower level.  That is to say, deductions from phenomena typically infer to theories that correct as well as explain the phenomena from which they have been deduced.
5.6.  The vexed notion of an “empirical basis”.
The example just mentioned indicates to us why it is at once both telling and misleading to think of science as possessing an “empirical basis”.  It is telling, because scientists do genuinely concern themselves with “phenomena” when they work both to discover and warrant what their theories should be like.  It is however misleading, since under analysis every such phenomenon proves to be itself theoretical.  To analyse as it were “all the way down” is patently impossible, so we are never going to discharge fully what is theoretical in science in favour of what is basic or given.
At low enough levels, the inference, if that is what it is, which leads to a phenomenological conclusion, has at most only the tacit form of a bootstrap or measuring inference.  It is a clear idealisation to suppose that rational inference has taken place at all.  The practice from out of which a conclusion (about a phenomenon) is fixed upon is not really of the form of an inference.  Practitioners have at this level but a tacit understanding of what is necessary for the possibility of what, or thus of what it is for an apparatus or technique to produce a genuine phenomenon.
In this sense science has no “empirical basis”.  It is synthetic not by reaching down to such a basis, but rather by rationally synthesising  that is to say, holding together with a view to its overall integrity before reason  an assemblage of practices, some of which extend ineluctably beyond the purview of discursive reasoning.  Thus the whole logic-oriented understanding of “synthetic” to which empiricist philosophers cleave (which I critically discussed above in Sections 4.11-4.13) is inadequate to the purpose of illuminating the meaningfulness of science.  Instead, an understanding of “synthetic” is needed which concerns the practical, and is thus in some wise ethical.
5.7.  A brief history of the coordinations of the concept of length.
To measure is to deduce something theoretical from phenomena, but phenomena are themselves theoretical.  We forget this sometimes because of how little option there sometimes seems to be for us to colligate phenomena in any way but one.  The phenomena of length are for example theoretical, and yet it may seem to us, for all practical purposes, that there is no choice at all theoretically, concerning what length is.  The measurement of length is however conditioned by theory.  It is conditioned by physical theory.  I mentioned in Section 3 that one such physical theory comes to us innately, and proves itself vastly productive and useful.  But this theory is in fact liable to correction, and indeed it has been corrected during the further advance of physics.
Briefly, the history of this is as follows.  First, Newton accepted the ready coordination of our concept of ‘length’ to Euclidean geometrical laws.  (It is eminently worth remarking however that Newton, a systematic empiricist, saw this step of his as an empirically warranted one, and one that he was taking in physics.  Newton ([1729] 1934, Preface) says that geometrical principles in general are “brought from without”, “founded in mechanical practice”, and are simply the purest part of the mechanical art of measuring lengths, angles and the like.)  But on the basis of the laws of Euclidean geometry alone, Newton showed how to consider the phenomena of inertiality  as these phenomena are colligated in his three axioms of motion  and deduce from them a certain connection between space and time.  This deduction from phenomena allowed Newton to specify a coordination of the concept ‘trajectory’ also to geometrical laws, a coordination which conserved all that had formerly followed from geometrical laws concerning ‘length’.  Of course the concept of trajectory is ineluctably spatiotemporal, so it concerns the structure not of space but of spacetime.  As I remarked in Section 2, Newton in effect realised this, and said: “let the symmetries of spacetime be no more than the symmetries of the phenomena of inertiality  for otherwise it is a nonsense that there should be such phenomena”.  Saying “let the symmetries of spacetime be no more than the symmetries of the phenomena of inertiality (as colligated by my axioms of motion)” is of course to make empirical (because connected to Newton’s physics) a set of questions about space and time.  Thus Newton’s spacetime doctrine is actually neither a prioristic, as is often claimed, nor transcendist: rather it concerns the phenomena, specifically, those phenomena that are colligated by Newton’s own empirically based principles of physics.  (I first learned this point from my former teacher Robert DiSalle.)  Newton’s spacetime doctrine patently addresses a necessary condition for the very possibility of these phenomena.
Moreover, Newton’s doctrine of spacetime structure is, as is not often realised, stipulational.  It gives content to various concepts concerning trajectories or families of trajectories, by coordinating these concepts to geometrical laws.  I owe this insight quite completely to DiSalle, whose important (1995) work from which it comes I will discuss more fully in a moment.  (See below, Section 5.14.)
Newton’s doctrine of spacetime structure of course defined how various quantities to do with trajectories may potentially be measured.  For example, his thought-experiments concerning the bucket and the two spheres joined by a rope concern the measurability of a state of rotation among the parts of a spatially extended thing.  Although Newton’s doctrine is stipulative  it coordinates by fiat the concept of rotation to certain geometrical laws  it nevertheless must prove its mettle empirically.  Just as the gently transported pencils which we discussed in 2 had better match when they are brought back together again, or else there is something wrong with our coordinating the concept ‘length’ to laws of Euclidean geometry, so also a vast complex of physical phenomena must hold together sensibly under Newton’s coordination to geometrical laws of the concept of rotation, or there is something wrong with our coordinating that concept in Newton’s way.  To take one simple example, imagine two buckets of water, one beneath the other on a common axis.  Whatever the one bucket determines concerning the state of absolute rotation, the other had better agree with, or there is something empirically useless about Newton’s proposed stipulation.
There is of course an immediate problem about Newton’s doctrine of spacetime structure, a problem which was apparent at the time, even without any of the adjustments which were still to come of the understanding of physical laws.  This concerns Newton’s failure to stipulate for spacetime neither more nor less symmetries than inhere in the phenomena of inertiality.  Because of this failure, Newton’s doctrine implied the objectivity of something physically unmeasurable  absolute velocity.
Newton’s coordination is as noted conservative in preserving in its form the prior implications from physical geometry concerning the physical processes for measuring lengths.  Moreover, it is simply silent about the processes of measurement for distant simultaneity.  In this respect it is likewise conservative, for no-one in Newton’s day had the least thought that temporal separations might have geometrical significance.  It never occurred to Newton that in coordinating the notion of a trajectory to geometrical principles, he should amend in any way the implications of his doctrine for the physical processes of measurement of either lengths or temporal separations.
I have argued that Newton aimed to have the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure.  This is not to say that Newton quite completely achieved this aim.  Newton's actual doctrine of spacetime failed in three respects which I have already noted to be as measured as it might have been.  First, Newton would have achieved a more measured view, had he understood spacetime structure in a way which does not imply the objectivity of absolute velocity.  In the face of corollary five of his laws of motion, Newton clearly appreciated this.  But, as I have noted, he could not quite see how to formulate the needed understanding.  Second, the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass is a symmetry in the phenomena which deserved to be reflected in Newton’s theory but was not.  Newton acutely grasped the relevant phenomenal symmetry.  He actually performed careful experiments to check the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass.  Moreover his statement and use of corollary six of his laws of motion essentially is the recognition of just such a general phenomenal symmetry.  It was however well beyond Newton’s capability given the mathematical resources available to him at the time to incorporate this symmetry in his theory (as Cartan later showed however can be done).  Thirdly, Newton’s silence about the physics of distant simultaneity is in its way something unmeasured about his doctrine of spacetime structure.  (Hermann Minkowski nicely brings out this criticism in his famous lecture “Space and Time” ([1908] 1923).)  There are undoubtedly still further ways in which a more measured stance than Newton’s concerning spacetime structure can be sought for: specifically, by considering the implications for spacetime structure of still other physical principles than those concerning inertiality.  I have argued only that Newton pursued the most measured understanding of spacetime, and that under the inspiration of this approach he argued in some ways extraordinarily well.  I do not say that Newton fully achieved such an understanding, for as history has helped to show, it is extraordinarily difficult to do so.
Einstein won advances in physical understanding in effect by recoordinating the concepts concerning trajectories and families of trajectories to rather different geometrical laws, laws which of course yield the familiar Euclidean ones in a limiting case.  One notable feature of Einstein’s recoordination is that it has reference to significantly recolligated phenomena of inertiality.  Einstein’s new coordination of kinematical concepts implied that Newton’s ideas concerning the physical processes of measurement of both spatial and temporal separations are correct only in a certain low-velocity limit.  Einstein’s coordination grounds for the first time the idea of the physical measurability of the spatiotemporal separation between any two events, and it of course implies that it is merely “in a frame” that spatial separations or temporal separations are measurable at all.  In this way the notion of ‘length’ was amended by Einstein.  Further emendation resulted when, using his “equivalence principle”, Einstein recolligated the phenomena of inertiality so that they comprehended gravitation.  After making that step, Einstein deduced from the phenomena of inertiality his so-called general relativistic doctrine that spacetime is metrically inhomogeneous.
In each of the four above-mentioned respects in which Newton’s understanding of spacetime was less measured than it might have been, Einstein’s was more measured than Newton’s.  Once again it would be an exaggeration to suggest that Einstein actually achieved the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure.  The path of discovery which Einstein followed was both convoluted and troubled by confusions.  It becomes natural to cast his successful inferences as deductions-from-phenomena only when they are viewed both with charity and from as it were a considerable historical distance.  Moreover even after he had shaken things down, and set out as well as he might the warrant for his views, there were many elements within his theory which were not connected in the tight way he wished them to be to evidence and other elements of theory.  Einstein was not himself happy with a doctrine of spacetime structure which was powerless to comprehend why there is inertiality at all.  He hoped that by generalising his theory in some way which would allow it to explain electromagnetism, he would be able to comprehend in terms of it why there is inertiality at all.​[20]​  I have argued only that Einstein pursued the most measured understanding of spacetime, and that under the inspiration of this approach he argued in some ways extraordinarily well.  I do not say that Einstein fully achieved such an understanding, for as history has helped to show, it is extraordinarily difficult to do so.
5.8.  An historical paradox concerning Einstein.
When we see Einstein as having pursued the most measured understanding of spacetime, the following historical paradox concerning him completely dissolves.  Historically it is false that
C.  Einstein opposed conventionalist doctrines about spacetime structure.
Therefore, one or more of the following statements is false:
P1.  If one studies spacetime physics and is a “scientific realist”, then one opposes conventionalist doctrines about spacetime structure.
P2.  Einstein was a “scientific realist”.
P3.  Einstein studied spacetime physics.
But it is very difficult to see which of P1 to P3 could be false.
P3 is a gross understatement and is certainly true in what it does say.  Not only did Einstein study spacetime physics very intensively to the point of creatively reshaping it.  Also, Einstein connected his philosophy of science very immediately with his thinking about spacetime physics.  So certainly there is no defect in P3.
P2 is an orthodoxy among scientific realists, who have adduced much textual evidence from Einstein in its support.  (The qualification to P2 which may be needed — “at least for the latter two-thirds of his life” — is irrelevant here.)
P1 also seems pretty obviously correct, for conventionalism about spacetime structure, its proponents tell us, simply is the anti-realist position that key principles of theory are neither true nor false.
Yet C is definitely false.  Einstein actually aided the development of conventionalism about spacetime structure.  Through his later years, he never once rescinded the commitments that at one or another time he had expressed in support of it.  During the first twenty years of the twentieth century, Einstein fairly lived and breathed the issues raised by Poincaré’s professed conventionalism about geometry.  In the late teens and early twenties, Einstein often discussed philosophy and spacetime theory with Schlick, and then in the late twenties and early thirties with Reichenbach.  Schlick and Reichenbach were key conventionalists about spacetime, whose views about spacetime Einstein in fact himself largely inspired.  Perhaps in his later years Einstein simply lost interest in the discussion of conventionalism, a discussion which had become very involved and to almost everyone’s eyes far removed from the cutting edge of theoretical physics.  Perhaps he came to feel that he in his own pronouncements had not ever done justice to the issue of conventionalism, for indeed he had committed to print some painful fallacies and confusions.  Or perhaps he felt that he had done justice to as much about the issue as is important for the practising physicist.  But even if, as is possible, Einstein became either frustrated or simply bored by the discussion, he did not seem ever to decide that the basic doctrine of conventionalism was wrong.
C follows validly from P1 to P3, so clearly something is amiss.  And because it seems hard to pinpoint what is amiss, I believe that our problem here is an interesting one.  I believe we can show that it is some general feature of assumptions that are brought into discussions of realism versus anti-realism and philosophy of space and time which creates this difficulty for us.
5.9.  Stategy for resolving this paradox.
My view is that the following assumption is an important initial cause of the difficulty:
A.  To approach the philosophy of spacetime physics, one is first to lay hold of either realism or anti-realism as one’s position in general philosophy of science, and then organise one’s thinking about spacetime physics accordingly.
I shall reject A, arguing instead that the most defensible philosophical perspective on spacetime physics resists categorisation as either “realist” or “anti-realist”.
In that case I can of course reject P2, if I join the venerable tradition of arguing that Einstein, if properly understood, believed just what I believe, and so himself rejected A.  An alternative resolution of my dilemma is to reject P1, by saying that conventionalist doctrines can be re-explained in a way which, believe it or not, made Einstein think it unnecessary that a “scientific realist” should reject them.  In fact my reasons for rejecting A and thus for questioning P2 are an inducement to adopting also this latter perspective and thus for rejecting P1.  One way or the other, I think that by working for the rejection of A, I can point to a way past the conundrum that is in front of us.
One way to work for the rejection of A is by using an idea of Einstein’s, that spacetime ought to be regarded as a “structural quality of the physical field” (Einstein [1920] 1961, p. 155).  In light of this idea, I think that I can make out, somewhat to my own surprise, that conventionalists actually have made a contribution to our understanding of spacetime physics.  My expectation is, however, that this puts what conventionalists say under an aspect which will be new to them, an aspect moreover under which what they say is really rather humdrum compared to the understanding of spacetime which implies it.  In light of Einstein’s “structural quality” idea, I furthermore think that I can make out, again somewhat to my own surprise, that in the relationist–absolutist controversy concerning spacetime there is both something right and also much which is misguided on both sides, and that the best vantage point for seeing this involves stepping outside of the traditional terms of that debate.  Both these results argue that, in the context of spacetime physics, “scientific realism” is a clumsy position, defensible in some respects but indefensible in others.  Assumption A is, in short, false.
5.10.  Einstein’s emphasis on the epistemology of spacetime.
To see this well, it is necessary to appreciate why Einstein’s “structural quality” idea is actually fundamentally epistemological rather than metaphysical.  It is, indeed, anti-metaphysical, at least to the extent that it implies that spacetime, so far as the physicist is concerned, does not transcend the material.  Indeed Einstein discussed many reasons why in his view it would be misguided epistemologically for a physicist to think that spacetime in any way transcends what is material.  Thus my own purpose, of discrediting A, will be served if I can justify this view of Einstein’s.  It is actually far more central to my purpose to discuss why Einstein’s “structural quality” idea is epistemological, than to employ this idea directly.
When Einstein said that he believed that spacetime is a structural property of the physical field, he was probably summarising the lesson of his ‘hole argument’.​[21]​  This argument had for a while convinced Einstein not to seek a generally covariant form for his field equations for gravitation.  It was necessary for Einstein to free himself from the false allure of this argument before he could set himself towards finding a successful formulation for the gravitational field equations.  As a key step towards removing his earlier confusion, Einstein developed a striking new conviction concerning the status of the manifold of spacetime points.​[22]​   He came to view the bare spacetime manifold as without any existence of its own.  How it arises, he came to believe, is simply out of the way that physical fields are knitted together.​[23]​  It has no further reality than that.  The two fields that Einstein had in mind as thus knitted together were the electromagnetic (EM) field (a field which, as Einstein well knew, is described incompletely and not altogether accurately by classical electromagnetic theory) and the metric field of his own new so-called general relativity theory (GR).  As I shall discuss in Section 5.17 below, Einstein expected that the two fields would be properly understood only when they were better comprehended together than GR had managed to do.
5.11.  Einstein’s similarities to Newton.
I believe I can justify Einstein’s own conception that his “structural quality” idea is actually fundamentally epistemological rather than metaphysical, in a way that Einstein would himself have found surprising: by showing that Newton would have totally agreed with him.  It does seem to me to argue well for a conception of how to be epistemologically responsible as a physicist, if two of the profoundest practitioners in the history of that science actually shared it.  Still stronger will such support be, if everyone’s first impression concerning the two practitioners is that they surely disagreed.  In any case, Newton not only did in effect agree with Einstein, but also gave cogent methodological reasons why to accept the epistemological position that Einstein had.
Like Einstein, Newton explicitly believed that spacetime points lack individuality outstripping their place within structures which we, on attending to the form that physical interactions take, define over them (Newton 1962, p. 136).  Like Einstein, Newton connected his study of spacetime structure directly with his knowledge of dynamics, that is to say, with what he knew about the form of physical interactions between things.  For both Newton and Einstein, a doctrine concerning spacetime structure is fundamentally epistemological.
5.12.  The most measured understanding of spacetime.
The burden of this view of both Newton and Einstein is just what I have emphasised throughout the present essay: an epistemologically responsible physicist adopts the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure.  Newton and Einstein were extraordinarily gifted measurers and thus sought for what in their respective circumstances were the most measured understandings possible of spacetime structure.  (This is a difficult task, and, as I have remarked, neither achieved complete success.  Their own conception of spacetime structure reflects however their methodological purpose not less directly than their actual achievement.) 
On a most measured understanding, spacetime structure cannot be made out as merely immanent in material goings-on, but then neither can it be made out as transcendent of material goings-on.  The most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure always lies on the line between immanentism and transcendentism.  On this line, the philosophers’ debates concerning the status of spacetime structure ​ conventionalism versus realism, absolutism versus relationalism  come to nothing.
5.13.  Between conventionalism and realism, relationalism and absolutism, immanentism and transcendentism.
Like Newton, Einstein held that physicists study what is physical, and find within the formal apparatus used in its description some elements that remind them of geometrical theory.  Einstein in fact  as I detail below in Section 5.17.  entertained some radical doubts concerning whether geometrical theories would continue to prove themselves availing in the science of physics.  But up to the present time at any rate, physicists have found among the features of the total structure that they are describing dimensionality, continuity, connectedness, etc., familiar from the science of geometry.  Some of these features, to be sure, are “geometrical” only by dint of the past broadening of the scope of that science.  The metrical structure for example that physics describes to us, fails to respect the classical condition of positive definiteness.  Whereas classically we think that the magnitude of the separation of any two things is non-negative, and zero only if the two things are one and the same, this condition is not respected within modern physical theory.  Moreover, classically we think of metrical structure as homogeneous, that is, everywhere the same, yet this too is not respected within modern physical theory.  Still, because geometers themselves had seen fit to relax the conditions of positive-definiteness and homogeneity, because the structures that the geometers themselves were thus led to survey were sufficiently like classical geometrical structures in other formal respects still to be thought of as geometries, the aspect of physical structure that is formally rendered as an inhomogenous non-positive-definite metric, can still be called geometrical structure.  According to Einstein, we then identify that part of physical theory, as our theory of space and time.  But really that part of physical theory, fits with the rest of physical theory seamlessly.  And that part of physical theory is, moreover, no less subject than other parts, to thoroughgoing reconceptualisation and correction if such becomes called for as a condition for theoretical physics to progress.
Conventionalists about spacetime structure have long (and thoroughly, and no doubt really very successfully) explored the fact that spacetime doctrines connect seamlessly with the rest of physics.  For many conventionalists, the purpose of this work is to warrant the conception that spacetime structure is merely immanent in material goings-on.  Their view seems to be that conventionality signifies immanence.  I believe however that this view is groundless.  It is true that in the most measured understanding of spacetime there is a kind of conventionality.  There is something stipulational, and a stipulation is partly conventional.  What is stipulated can have regard however for idealised phenomena rather than just the actual material goings-on.  And when this is so it would be wrong to think that conventionality signifies immanence.
Opponents of conventionalism mostly hold that spacetime structure transcends material goings-on, i.e. that spacetime structure is prior to such goings on and in its form helps determine their form.  In other words, spacetime structure should be thought an explanation for, not merely a way of representing, various patterns which physics notes within the material goings-on.  Defenders of this point of view consider the spatiotemporal structures that are needed before the patterns which physics notes can be represented, and they question whether immanentists are able on their own methods really to lay hold of these structures.   Thus this traditional way of opposing conventionalism is essentially realist.  It holds that spacetime structures are objective, precisely because they possess an independent reality.  The warrant for postulating them is that they are needed as an explanation for physical phenomena.  The target of this traditional response is less conventionalism per se, than its associated immanentism.
Immanentism about spacetime structure opposes transcendentism also in the debate between relationalists and absolutists.  Relationalism as a thesis about the ideology of spacetime theories is scarcely any other than the thesis of immanentist conventionalism.  Relationalism as a thesis about the ontology of spacetime theories is however a distinctive position from this.  (See Friedman 1983, p. 264 and p. 217.) Absolutists oppose ontological relationalists about space or time or spacetime by positing space or time or spacetime as an independent existent.  The warrant for the posit is supposed to be that it alone best allows one to explain what we see.  According to the absolutists, the relationalists are quite without the wherewithal adequately to explain observed phenomena.
When Einstein commented that spacetime is a “structural quality of the physical field”, he showed, as it seems to me, how to hit the line between immanentism and transcendentism, rather than siding with one or the other.  This middle position follows given the methodological demand to add nothing further to the doctrine of spacetime than is required to comprehend the facts of materiality, yet also to include nothing less.  It is, in short, if it can be made out, the most measured understanding possible of spacetime structure.  It is neither an explaining away of spacetime structure in terms of other facts of materiality, nor an explaining of other facts of materiality in terms of spacetime structure.
To understand this middle position, it is important to see why Einstein’s “structural quality” idea is epistemological.  This is because Einstein’s doctrine of spacetime structure is in its way stipulational.  Einstein denied that spacetime structure should be thought a separate explanation for patterns which physics discerns in material goings-on.  He complained forcefully against the idea of spatiotemporal structures being the cause of any such patterns that we meet with.  His most-measured understanding of spacetime structure was thus not transcendist in any way.  Nevertheless it idealised, since its stipulated coordination of spacetime concepts was not to actual measurement operations, but to physical laws, specifically those found in the rest of physics.  It was not at all immanentist, just as it was not at all transcendist.
5.14.  DiSalle on spacetime theory as physical geometry.  
I have carefully expressed myself in terms consonant with Robert DiSalle’s recent and insightful treatment of spacetime theory as physical geometry (DiSalle, 1995).  DiSalle discusses the stipulational yet empirical nature of the sorts of coordinations to physical laws of geometrical concepts like ‘length’ and ‘rotation’.  He concludes from his discussion that 
...  the nature of spacetime is a question, not of whether a theoretical entity provides a causal explanation for appearances, but of whether the physical processes of measurement conform to geometrical laws.  ... To claim that space is Euclidean only means that measurements agree with the Euclidean metric; Euclidean geometry, if true, can’t causally explain those measurements, because it only expresses the constraints to which those measurements will conform.  This clearly does not imply that the content of spatial geometry somehow reduces to measurement operations.  For Euclidean geometry systematises those measurements and exhibits them as aspects of a formal structure, something more abstract and more exact than the appearances could express by themselves.  To claim that that formal structure is really the structure of actual space, is not to posit an underlying cause of the appearances.  It is only to claim that, modulo the initial coordination, the appearances conform to the laws of that structure.  (DiSalle 1995, pp. 323-324.)
In my own view this passage points to a middle ground between conventionalism and realism, relationalism and absolutism, immanentism and transcendentism.  Like DiSalle I consider that the two great practitioners of physics Newton and Einstein found their way (as best they could) to the position which DiSalle describes here, and thus, as I would say, to the middle ground.  Einstein’s philosophical development was complex, and I hope to remark some of its complexities in a moment.  But Einstein’s mature position was, I believe, clear.  It can, by a close paraphrasing of DiSalle’s remarks, be stated as follows.  Einstein coordinated to his own field equations of general relativity theory the various geometrical concepts, in such a way that spacetime is stipulated to have a structure depending, in just the ways specified by those laws, on the distribution of matter-energy.  
... To claim that spacetime is this structural quality of the physical field, only means that measurements agree with the relevant metric; the relevant geometry, if true, can’t causally explain those measurements, because it only expresses the constraints to which those measurements will conform.  This clearly does not imply that the content of spacetime geometry somehow reduces to measurement operations.  For the relevant geometry systematises those measurements and exhibits them as aspects of a formal structure, something more abstract and more exact than the appearances could express by themselves.  To claim that that structural quality of the physical field is really the structure of actual spacetime, is not to posit an underlying cause of the appearances.  It is only to claim that, modulo the initial coordination, the appearances conform to the laws of that structure.
In short, our spacetime concepts derive their content by being coordinated to physical laws.  Such coordination is stipulational, but then it proves its mettle in an empirical way.  This position is altogether on the line between conventionalism and realism.  It is not itself conventionalist and it is not itself realist, because it implies that the division between these positions cannot really open up.
5.15.  Objections to this conception considered and rejected.
It may be objected that, because, in Einstein’s general relativity theory (GR), spacetime structure is itself dynamical, and because it assimilates gravitational phenomena to inertia, the account just offered of the status of spacetime structure will not work for it.  For, as is well known, GR implies that energy-momentum can be carried in the geometry of spacetime.  GR is both a local theory and a non-linear one.  It implies that there can be gravitational waves, as massive as all get-out.  It implies, in its way, that gravity itself gravitates and to this extent presents itself to us as something itself real.  Yet the position that I have outlined seems to deny reality to gravity, which it assimilates to a stipulated inertial structure, to stipulated ways in which various concepts concerning trajectories etc. will be used.  What can it say, then, concerning the case where, as we might say, a massive gravitational wave disturbs things?  What can it say even concerning the planets in their motion about the sun?  For because GR is a local theory, the planets cannot be supposed to take their marching orders, as it were, from the sun.  They move inertially, and so  as proponents of GR generally explain things  they take their marching orders from what is local to them, viz., the local geometry of spacetime.  Do these considerations not heap reason upon reason to treat spacetime as something in its own right real?
Without a doubt, Einstein himself sometimes chose ways of talking which imply that they do. (See especially Einstein [1920] 1922 and [1924] 1991.)  Yet the mooted standpoint is also one which Einstein overtly resists, for example in his maintaining as he did his professed determination to understand spacetime as a structural quality of the physical field.​[24]​  To appreciate Einstein’s position I believe that one needs to remark two further features of GR, first of all that it directs itself beyond an efficient-causal to a more purely formal mode of comprehending the facts which it embraces, and secondly, that it is quite evidently not a final theory, but rather quite evidently stands in need of further generalisation and refinement.
Why do the planets fall about one another and the sun the way they do?   This question seems to demand a causal answer, but I believe that it actually is a mistake to give it one.  To some extent the question should be resisted as ill-formed, for it is not even clear that falling is actually something that the planets do.  The question in front of us strikes me as similar to the following: why are the planets spaced?  That is to say, why do they take up positions outside one another, in a richly geometrically structured array of such positions?  There are two things to note about the question why the planets are spaced, each of which in my view makes it like the question why the planets fall about one another and the sun the way they do.  First, it is problematic whether the planets are spaced.  We in fact have learned that, absolutely speaking, they are not — that is, it is only in a reference-frame-dependent way that the planets are spaced, and what is absolute are arrangements that are ineluctably spatiotemporal.  And second, it is best not to view the question of why the planets are spaced, even insofar as we take this question to be well formed, as seeking knowledge of a cause.  That the planets are spaced (to the extent that they are) concerns simply a formal feature of physicality generally.  To the extent that it is either necessary or possible to understand it, the understanding of why the planets are spaced will be formal rather than causal.  The planets are spaced (to the extent that they are) because that is an aspect of the form that physical reality in general takes.
Why then, do the planets fall (to the extent that they do) as they do about one another and the sun?  This question deserves, in my view, an identical answer.  It is appropriate to correct the question as well as answering it.  And the answer is not in terms of a cause, but rather in terms of something formal.  Precisely by the trajectories of the planets being as they are, a certain formal, geometrical condition is satisfied.  It is a mistake, I believe, to say instead that the planets move as they do, because they are caused to do so.  It is a mistake to think that they pick up marching orders from anything, either the sun or the local geometry of spacetime.  The motions are as they are for formal not causal reasons.
I accept that something more does need to be said.  I cannot just say that a certain formal, geometrical condition is satisfied, and leave it at that.  There is still something further to explore, concerning — in some sense — why this condition is satisfied.  For GR does not allow us to understand inertiality itself.  And to this extent the understanding from GR of spacetime structure is less measured than we need it to be.  In merely invoking inertiality as it does, GR is a bit more like an inference to a metaphysical explanation, and a bit less like a formal understanding that has been deduced from phenomena, than would be ideal.  Note however, that the question why there is inertiality, itself need not be directed towards delineation of a cause.  Einstein himself expected that by comprehending electromagnetism structurally, just as he had already comprehended gravitation structurally, he would be led to an understanding of inertiality itself.   That is to say, Einstein expected that he might discover a formal rather than causal explanation for inertiality.  It was by a generalisation of the kind of (purely formal) understanding met with in GR, that Einstein hoped to understand what inertiality itself is.
I have argued that the most measured understanding of spacetime involves something less than transcendentist commitments.  For this reason I believe that on the most measured understanding of spacetime, it is impossible that spacetime structure should be a cause of anything.  What then can I say concerning the physical disturbances which would register the arrival of a massive gravitational wave?  I think that it is actually not difficult to give an account of this.  The concepts concerning trajectories which I say are merely stipulated, must also, I say, prove their mettle empirically.  To stipulate in the way encouraged upon us by GR is to imply that, potentially, there can be complexities in local inertial structure, complexities which may aptly be described as the local passing through of a gravitational wave.  To accept GR is to stipulate uses for the terms in which we reckon inertiality in a way which implies a kind of non-linear deformability in inertial structure.  To this extent, to accept GR is to accept that “gravity gravitates”.  Yet — as Einstein himself forthrightly insisted — GR in no way faces us with a hidden cause for physical events, but directs us rather to a general formal feature of them.
5.16.  Einstein confused about his relationship to Newton.
Newton is usually taken to have held that spacetime is physically more fundamental than matter itself.  Prior to the work of Howard Stein, at any rate, the orthodox view of Newton was that he treated spacetime as structured in a certain way prior to there being any material things or processes in it at all, and that he simply started with a doctrine of spacetime structure, before he proceeded to a discussion of the physics of matter.  In fact, however, as Stein, and more recently DiSalle, have eloquently argued, Newton developed his doctrine of space and time in order to account to himself (with exceptional philosophical care) for the conceptual presuppositions of his dynamical principles.  Thus Newton in fact prioritised the physics of matter to the structure of spacetime.  Newton had, moreover, like Einstein, a very physicalised understanding of the status of geometry itself.  Newton had a profound understanding of the art of measurement, and accompanying this, a singularly clear and searching grasp of the relationship between physical theory and experimental practice.  In his doctrine of space and time, and in his work as a physicist generally, he can be regarded as having set an epistemological example which Einstein then very much followed.
On one level, the relationship between Einstein and Newton is complicated.  Einstein understood Newton to have been a poor epistemologist.  There seem to have been two conflicting reasons why Einstein thought this, both of them based upon an inadequate appreciation of Newton.  One reason was that Einstein supposed that Newton proved himself rather incautious epistemologically, rather too ready in his work to undertake the tasks of a metaphysician.  Another reason was that Newton, in Einstein’s view, was mistaken to think that epistemological caution is possible: theoretical conclusions cannot, he said, be directly “deduced from phenomena” as Newton claimed that they could.  The curious thing here is that Einstein actually very forthrightly urged epistemological caution himself and in fact achieved it in his own work precisely by employing the method of Newton’s which he said could never work.  (This fact about Einstein was first studied systematically by Jon Dorling.  Since then, in works cited among the references below, Clark Glymour, John Earman, John Norton, William Harper, Robert DiSalle, and my former PhD student David Gunn, have added to the case which can be made in its support.)  Moreover Newton was not the epistemologically incautious figure that Einstein supposed that he was, for he too employed the method of deductions from phenomena, just as he claimed to have done.  (Again Dorling was early to point this out, and Glymour and the others have added to our understanding of this.)  In particular, Newton never undertook in his work the metaphysical tasks which Einstein thought he saw there.  Epistemologically Einstein followed the very path that Newton had blazed, without realising however that Newton had been there before him.  Thus on another level Einstein’s relationship to Newton is simple.  They each developed essentially the same understanding of the way to be an epistemologically responsible physicist.  I have extracted above from this understanding an answer to my question, how can it have been epistemological, for Einstein to have held that spacetime is just a “structural quality of the physical field”?  And we have also seen that the way Einstein steered a middle course between immanentism and transcendentism, was also actually Newton’s way.
Newton in effect determined by a deduction from the phenomena of inertiality what his views must be concerning the structure of spacetime.  Significantly, however (as DiSalle has emphasised), Newton then located his conclusions concerning the structure of spacetime in the scholium to the definitions.  The theoretical convictions which Newton had concerning space and time, essentially stipulated what was to be meant by the terms he used to express these convictions.  Yet they were not the less empirical because this was so.  On the contrary, the proof of their worth was that, without them, sense could not be made of empirically based dynamical laws.
Newton’s method of deductions from phenomena was as I have acknowledged in all instances a fallible one.  Nevertheless, Newton employed this method in an extraordinarily exacting, epistemologically most-cautious way.  For first, Newton carefully restricted his theoretical starting points to a very few, just Euclidean geometry plus the three laws, or axioms, of motion.  Second, the very few theoretical starting points which Newton did employ were such that no-one in that day would have raised the slightest complaint against them.  They were, at least from the contemporary vantage point, as innocuous as any theoretical starting-points could be.  And third, Newton demanded of these theoretical starting-points that they could afford not only one but rather many and varied deductions from phenomena, all to highly consequential and thus multiply intersecting theoretical conclusions.  (Thus they allowed for rich overdetermination by empirical evidence of the theoretical conclusions which they led Newton to draw.)
Newton’s method, because it was an exacting, epistemologically cautious one, very effectively eschewed the metaphysical largesse of inference to the best explanation on the one hand, even while it also avoided the impossible restrictions of an operationalistic empiricism on the other hand.  It was a method which combined the rationalist demand for unification with the empiricist demand that theoretical conclusions be induced from the evidence.
Moreover, Einstein himself followed exactly this method.  Einstein failed to articulate this method with as much care or accuracy as Newton did, and officially, of course, Einstein threw his support behind conjecture-and-refutation-type, i.e. inference-to-the-best-explanation philosophy of science.  Einstein, with Popper’s help, muddied the understanding of induction.  He falsely professed himself to be anti-inductivist.  But like Newton, Einstein’s method was in fact carefully to deduce from phenomena principles which he would then render general by induction.  He like Newton used induction, not naively, but in a way which cleaved simultaneously to the rationalist demand for theoretical unification, and to the empiricist demand for the evidence to lead the way.  And by working in this way, Einstein, like Newton, steered a middle course between on the one hand the laxness of inferring to something just because of the way it explains things and on the other hand the stringency of an excessively strict empiricism.
5.17. Einstein’s “structural quality” idea tolerates very considerable scepticism concerning current spacetime doctrines.
When Einstein articulated the “structural quality” idea about the status of spacetime, he was working, as he believed, towards a “unified field theory”.  He was working, that is, as he believed towards a correction, as well as explanation, of his own earlier doctrine of spacetime structure.  It is important to consider how radically Einstein expected that a satisfactory theory of the unified field might correct general relativity theory.  For this shows that Einstein’s “structural quality” idea tolerates very considerable scepticism concerning whether the geometrical affections of the world are ultimate at all.
By some sort of generalisation of the structures which he had laid before us in the theory of general relativity, Einstein hoped to comprehend the electromagnetic force together with gravitation in a unified way.  Physicists at that time had no further forces yet in mind besides gravity and electromagnetism.  And Einstein had already comprehended gravity as inertia.  That is to say, within his general theory of relativity, Einstein had successfully assimilated gravity to the affine structure of spacetime.  Yet general relativity theory also very much heightened the importance of the question, what is inertia?  Whence arises a body’s tendency to travel the straightest path?  There were many reasons why Einstein expected that electromagnetic theory would ultimately yield the clues that are needed in order to answer this deep-lying question.  Once already within Einstein’s own lifetime, electromagnetic theory had yielded the beginnings of an understanding of mass or inertia — it had, in the late-nineteenth-century heyday of the so-called “electromagnetic world-picture”, come some way towards explaining, wholly electromagnetically, the resistivity to acceleration, that is to say, the inertia, of the electron.  Moreover, electromagnetic theory was already deeply implicated in Einstein’s theory of gravity.  For general relativity theory was a generalisation of special relativity theory, and special relativity theory described the kinematical conditions under which alone may electromagnetism respect the so-called principle of special relativity which mechanics respects, a principle which, in its way, structures the very notion of inertia.  Thus it is unmysterious why Einstein worked as he did, attempting to generalise general relativity theory into a theory of a unified field.
Einstein was at the same time of course profoundly aware of the “problem of the quantum”, which he had himself in large measure helped to discover.  Einstein in fact devoted himself from his earliest researches to the end of his life to studying and attempting to surmount the “deep-going opposition” in physics between fields and particles.  As a number of historians of physics, particularly Martin Klein, have helped to show, Einstein’s endeavour to surmount this opposition inspired really all of his great work.  (See for example Klein 1980.)  Whereas the quantum theory ultimately accepted as insurmountable the opposition which he had sought to overcome, Einstein had excellent grounds to think such acceptance stultifying: for in his own work, it was precisely the effort to overcome this opposition that had fostered all his great discoveries.  Nevertheless, Einstein had himself hugely contributed to the early development of quantum theory.  Moreover, the “problem of the quantum” exercised him keenly throughout his life.  As John Stachel has very nicely documented (Stachel, 1986), this “problem” in fact led Einstein in his later years to entertain some very radical doubts concerning how he ought to conceive of the unified field.  In particular, Einstein doubted whether the mathematics of the continuum would ultimately prevail in physics.  Significantly, however, Einstein was not able, even for purposes of speculation, to make out at all successfully to himself what an alternative mathematical approach in physics would be like.
(Einstein once remarked:  “Only two things are infinite: the universe, and human stupidity.  And I am not sure about the former.”  This is intriguing.  One wonders about the actual significance of this remark.  It is multiply ambiguous.  Clearly, Einstein was unsure not only about whether outwardly, in terms of its total extent, the universe is infinite, but also about whether inwardly, in terms of how finely divisible it is, the universe is infinite.  Moreover, there is more than one thing that Einstein might have meant by human stupidity.  One aspect among others which Einstein was aware of concerned the difficulty that humans have in even conceiving that the universe is finite inwardly, i.e. in conceiving how it could possibly be otherwise than infinitely divisible.  Einstein himself of course managed to conceive how the universe could be finite outwardly, but he struggled, ultimately unsuccessfully, to find even a possible way to conceive how it might be finite inwardly.)
Einstein’s uncertainties about the continuity of spacetime were of course eminently reasonable.  Not only did he have the problem of the quantum to worry about, but also he like anyone else was without any adequate warrant for the idea that the universe is inwardly infinite.  This idea is for all we know perhaps not even mathematically coherent.  Indeed (from Gödel’s work) we know that it is mathematically impossible that we should know that the idea of the continuum is mathematically coherent.  Supposing that mathematically the idea does make coherent sense, however, we are in that case in coherent possession of the concept of infinity.  And in terms of this concept, we are bound to admit that, whatever the physical evidence, it is an infinite leap beyond this evidence it to suppose that the universe is inwardly infinite.  We might have good empirical grounds for thinking that differences out at an eleventh or twelfth decimal place are physically significant.  It is however an infinite leap to conclude from this that differences out at the ten-to-the-ten-to-the-tenth decimal place are physically significant, and so on, out as far as you please.  Thus, simple scientific caution helped make eminently reasonable Einstein’s uncertainties about the continuity of spacetime.  It was simply an additional reason for Einstein to doubt the continuum, that he hoped possibly to discover a better way to represent quantum phenomena by doing so.
It is I think a telling fact concerning Einstein’s “structural quality” idea that it tolerates even his uncertainties about the continuity of spacetime.  That is to say, Einstein could make out, in terms of this idea, how a scientist such as himself could employ, tentatively, a doctrine of spacetime structure, and yet remain agnostic on many questions, including indeed whether the world really divides into continuum-many bits (on which there literally are the differentiability etc. structures generally imputed to the spacetime manifold).  To say that a continuous spacetime structure such as that laid before us by general relativity theory is a “structural quality of the physical field” is simply to claim for it some measure of objectivity.  It would of course be ridiculous, in the face of the success of general relativity theory, to claim less for such structure than that it has some measure of objectivity.  But it is significant that Einstein was himself not willing to claim more than this.  Einstein doubted the true continuity of the field and so was open to the possibility that he would need to revise quite significantly the general conception of a field which he had inherited from his predecessors.  (It is true, however, that Einstein found it difficult in his own head even to imagine what such a revision could be like.)
In general, to say that something is a “structural quality of the physical field” is to claim simply some measure of objectivity for it.  It makes sense for example to think that gravity, although the very idea of it is not completely correct, comes out all right as a “structural quality of the physical field”.  Given an understanding in physics not actually any profounder than the one which Einstein gave us, we can of course appreciate some of the limits that there are to the accuracy of the very idea of gravity.  That is to say, we can see, in terms of a richer understanding, how to correct as well as explain this very conception of a force of gravity — as this conception occurs, for example, in Newtonian gravitational theory.  Yet as a “structural quality of the physical field”, Newtonian gravity clearly lays claim to objectivity, inasmuch as it is explained as well as corrected by superceding knowledge.  Likewise I think that there is little doubt that Kepler’s principles of planetary motion (though they stand in need of correction) concern a veritable “structural quality” of the material universe.  Likewise Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism concerns such a quality, as does Coulomb’s theory of electrostatic attraction, and so on.  More or less limited “structural qualities” abound in physics, when you admit that they are what we thought they were only subject to correction.  Einstein’s “structural quality” idea is tolerant because it permits a healthy agnosticism concerning the extent to which any actual “structural quality” conforms to our present conceptions.  If however we have a theory which, like the theories of Newton, Kepler, Maxwell, and Coulomb, successfully “embraces a complex of phenomena” or is as we might instead say richly “bootstrap confirmed”, then it would be fantastic if it is wholly without objective significance.  Such a theory is going to concern in some way or other a structural quality of the physical field.  This is so even though the extent and nature of the theory’s claim to truth may remain significantly up for grabs.
Notice also that even if, in some sense, the programme of field theory itself proves mistaken, i.e. in need of fundamental correction as well as explanation, it could still be said that theories such as Newton’s or Maxwell’s describe structural qualities of the physical field.  For it is all right to use the concept of a physical field provided this concept possesses some measure of objectivity.  Yet it surely does possess objectivity in at least “some measure”.  As I have remarked, Einstein was fully aware that some (possibly quite thoroughgoing) correction to the field concept might ultimately be needed.
I hope it is clear then that Einstein could uphold his “structural quality” idea and be at the same time agnostic about many things.  In the face of this idea, it is unlikely that Einstein accepted a “scientific realist’s” sense of the commitments which a scientist assumes on accepting a scientific theory.  On considering, for example, his own best theory of spacetime structure, which was based upon the mathematics of the continuum, Einstein could say of it that it concerned some “structural quality of the physical field” without committing himself completely even to the need to describe this field with mathematics based on the continuum.
5.18.  Einstein’s epistemological modesty agrees exactly with Newton’s.
Evidently Einstein was modest in the commitments which he assumed on accepting physical theories, such as his own.  On Einstein’s own view, he was investigating a physical structure all right  one which he called, perhaps roughly speaking, a field.  But Einstein also held that this physical structure may well be in undiscovered ways foreign to all present best conceptions.  So far as his theory of spacetime was concerned, Einstein committed himself to the following, and no more.  Among the structural features of the physical field are either dimensionality, continuity, connectedness, etc., which are familiar from the science of geometry, or at least something like these features, i.e. other features which would however explain the usefulness of such geometrical notions in our physics so far.  Wherever Einstein employed geometrical notions, he intended these to describe something physical  and to describe what is physical in a way which might well require subsequent correction as well as explanation.  He therefore was certainly not investigating how to reduce what is physical to what is geometrical, nor was he committing himself to any more than the objectivity in some measure of what is geometrical.
Now, as it seems to me, these facts about Einstein show clearly that he would agree completely with Newton’s understanding of the relation of physics to truth.  Against the rashness, epistemologically, of making out truth as a metaphysical idea, Einstein like Newton would reflexively cleave to the most-measured point of view.  On such a view it would be irresponsible to assume commitment to any less than objectivity in some measure to structures laid before us in that present theoretical reckoning of things which is as measured as we can presently make it.  It would on the other hand be irresponsible to assume commitment to more than this.  Note how in this case Einstein agrees, quite completely, with Newton’s methodological understanding of truth (discussed above in Section 5.4.).
6.  CONCLUSIONS: THEORY, PRACTICE AND THE STATUS OF SPACETIME.
People typically adopt not a cautiously methodological, but instead a fully metaphysical view of truth.  Why this is is essentially because it takes great genius and a lucky choice of subject matter to discern the possibility of a most-measured, neither metaphysical nor merely instrumentalistic point of view.  Hitting the line between immanentism and transcendentism is difficult.  Few if any people in the world actually totally manage to do it.  It is I believe only in physics that, in science, this ideal is approached closely at all.  (The ideal is however also approached closely, in my view, in at least some morally exemplary practical behaviour.  For example, I would liken Socrates, Hypatia or Ghandi, as moral leaders, to Newton and Einstein as leading physicists.)
Truth seems to us metaphysical because there is no way to reckon theoretically quite all the practical conditions that there are in order for our theories to have sense.  Thus we are inclined to view the sense which theories have as not relating purely to practice.  The failure of operationalism as a philosophy of science nicely illustrates for us the impossibility of reckoning theoretically every last practical condition that there is in order for theory to have sense.  Operationalism is the failed attempt to capture altogether completely in theory the connection which theory has with practice.
This impossibility has also been remarked in other ways.  Well-known arguments by Hilary Putnam (for example in his 1978, 1980 and 1981) in my view concern this limitation. If, per impossibile, a theory were to have comprehended in its own terms its entire relation to practice, then it would be something free-floating, and its truth (Putnam shows) would be automatic and therefore cheap.  (This expression is from Lewis 1984, who does not however do justice to Putnam’s argument in my view.)  The really interesting element of Putnam’s argument is less the conclusion that truth would be cheap, than the hypothesis  viz., of there possibly being a theory which had grown so perfect that it could comprehend in its own terms its entire relation to practice.  Truth is not cheap, and Putnam’s argument therefore demonstrates the impossibility of such a theory.  Still other arguments also demonstrate this impossibility.  In Lewis Carroll’s parable of Achilles and the tortoise, we learn that not all the elements of the practice even of logical argumentation are capturable within theoretical belief-structures.  (Lewis 1984 helpfully points to this parallel.)  The parable teaches us to respect as insurmountable the separation of axioms from rules of inference.  A crucial way that the logician has of working, is in principle not capturable as just another theoretical element that the logician can profess.  It seems, therefore, that the impossibility that a theory should comprehend its entire relation to practice, reaches very deep; so deep, indeed, that we meet with this limitation even in logic.
In physics, a practitioner can come perhaps closer than is possible in any other inquiry to comprehending theoretically the theory’s own connection to practice.  (An interesting article to consider in this connection is Martin Carrier’s 1990.)  This is what has made operationalism a tempting doctrine in philosophy of physics, though, as we know, even in physics the doctrine of operationalism is not truly admissible.  Why physics has this special quality is, as I believe, that it is singularly able to achieve its insights by measurement.
Physics is a discipline within which, more than any other, ‘speculation’ functions as a term of derision.  Physics really expects its practitioners to walk the line between immanence and transcendence, and thus to eschew both the metaphysical largesse of inferences-to-the-best-explanation and yet also the sceptical excesses of an anti-realist empiricism.  I believe that only in physics is it remotely possible for practitioners to walk this line (and only the best of physicists can do it).   I believe that only in physics can truth be treated essentially epistemologically rather than metaphysically.
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^1	  I believe that this illustrates concretely what Hilary Putnam has endeavoured to explain to us, as, in effect, a kind of Kantian connection between epistemology and ethics.  See his (1981).
^2	  Actually, Aristotle would have been both a better philosopher of physics and indeed a better physicist had he increased in some ways the connections he drew between physics and ethics.  As regards ethics, Aristotle had a searching regard for the thoroughgoing fundamentality of practice to all theoretical knowledge.  In his philosophy of physics, he laid, by contrast, almost no emphasis on practice.  The conception then was that natural philosophy is contemplative.  In the context of his philosophy of physics Aristotle consequently emphasised observation rather than experimentation, to the detriment both of his philosophy of physics and indeed his physics.
^3	  Workers on Newton’s methodology who have championed the view that he did indeed deduce his conclusions from phenomena include Dorling, Glymour, Harper, DiSalle, and (with qualifications) Stein.
^4	  I elaborate this point with a definite example in §3.8, below.
^5	  I owe this insight to Robert DiSalle, whose important (1995) work on spacetime theory as physical geometry I shall discuss more fully later.  See below, especially Section 5.14.
^6	  For further discussion of this, see Wilson (1992) (and the references therein contained).
^7	  So-called “entity realists” in philosophy of science (such as Hacking 1983 and Cartwright 1983) by contrast firmly deny that there is any general theoretical moral to be won from the result of specific measurements in science.  In particular, Cartwright contends that the significance of measurement is “phenomenological” and thus concrete or specific, rather than “theoretical” and thus abstract or general.  Cartwright (in her 1989) explicitly endorses bootstrap or deductions-from-phenomena methodology, but only as the pattern of inference to relatively low-lying, still reasonably concrete conclusions (concerning the “capacities” of things).  She and her fellow “entity-realists” professedly are “theoretical anti-realists”.  In their view, therefore, the commitments by which science is laden are, accordingly, materialist in a particularly striking way.  It is beyond the scope of the present article to consider this view fully.  I fully share the conviction of these philosophers that philosophy of science has in the past attended less than it should to the practical circumstances of experimental measurement.  However, over against these “entity realists”, I believe that “theoretical” and “experimental” science share the one deductions-from-phenomena methodology.  Thus “theoretical” and “experimental” reaches of science are not methodologically disparate as these particular “theoretical anti-realists” must contend that they are.  Indeed, in my view, they are instead interlinked so tightly that it is even somewhat artificial to distinguish between them.  Newton, for example, was a great experimentalist, even in those phases of his work which are at the same time surely highly theoretical.  Newton and his successors have worked in ways which defy understanding in the terms that “entity realist / theoretical anti-realist” philosophy of science provides.  This is why I oppose Cartwright and Hacking at least so far as theoretical physics is concerned.  Significantly, I oppose very sharply their insistence that the commitments by which science is laden are chiefly ontological.
^8	  For, to know yourself you must first look out of yourself so as to consider what you are for your society.  This is because, in order actually to know yourself, you would need first to discern clearly what your functions for your fellows are.  But to discover this, Socrates argued, you would need to consider the state of the whole society, and this in an idealised way.  You would need to consider the potential functions for one another of altogether everyone, and then determine how, potentially, people’s functions generally, when taken all together, might best be made one harmonious whole.  Only through successfully completing all this could you know yourself.  Yet to achieve such understanding of the ideal way for society to be, would, Socrates insisted, in fact require still higher understanding.  It would require understanding how the world as a whole, natural as well as social, best accommodates a human social order.  In this way, Socrates’ ethical injunction “know thyself” pointed people along the path to physics.
^9	  Plato  initially taking his lead from Socrates  sought to delineate (as well as he might) not only the social system, but also the whole world system, in which reason could be truly at home.  Plato therefore promulgated the bold idea that there is a physics of the world.  To give content to this bold idea Plato turned to mathematics  for in mathematical demonstration, Plato discerned a sphere of human action in which reason for once feels completely at home.  To perform ruler-and-compass mathematical constructions  for example, given a rectangle, to construct with ruler and compass the square that is its equal in area  is to illustrate nearly perfectly, if also very narrowly, that quality of action or way of being which Socrates bid us quest to make our own in life generally.  When we perform a geometrical construction, reason commends every step as necessary, and so determines the action’s overall form.  A quality of the whole situation  the form of space itself  determines the best or most beautiful way for us to achieve an end.  To Plato, who shared entirely Socrates’ rationalist apprehension of the good, it seemed unutterably wonderful that mathematical demonstrations are at once ramified, practical, and temporal, and yet also holistic, rational, and timeless.  Plato actually advocated systematic instruction of young people in mathematics precisely because he expected that the practice at mathematics would improve them morally.
^10	  There were exceptions particularly in late antiquity, such as Hero of Alexandria and the great Archimedes.  In many respects the so-called Scientific Revolution consists in the recovery of the orientation to practice as well as theory of the odd late Greek thinker such as Archimedes.  It remains, however, for the most part unexceptionable, to state that the Greeks conceived theoretical inquiry to be contemplative.
^11	  It is in some respects useful to make a comparison with the case of a collection of first-order laws of arithmetic.  We know for sure that they are incomplete, i.e. that there is far more to the arithmetical order than the stated laws can state.
^12	  For more about this, see Leo Corry (1997a) and (1997b).
^13	  Clark Glymour in Chapter 3 of his (1992) discusses in an excellently clear way why this is so.  So also does Michael Friedman in Chapter 1 of his (1992).  Glymour and Friedman themselves draw on discussions by Eves, Hintikka, Parsons, Heath and Pasch.
^14	  This at least is the lesson that philosophers have drawn from Quine’s own arguments.  Mark Wilson (1981) questions whether it is actually tenable to draw such conclusions from Quine’s own arguments.
^15	 Of course some philosophers, notably anti-realists such as Nancy Cartwright (1983, 1989) and Bas van Fraassen (1980), dispute whether, from the standpoint of metaphysics, there really are deep-going patterns in the phenomena that can be captured as theoretical laws (Cartwright), or at least whether it would ever be reasonable for us to commit ourselves to the reality of these patterns (van Fraassen).  If either of them were right, how significantly would this argue against what I am saying here?  In Section 6.4, I consider Newton’s methodological conception of the relation of physics to truth.  Because I endorse this conception I believe that in fact I can significantly agree with their anti-realist conclusions about laws of nature, even if I disagree with their empiricist starting points.  For I argue that while the laws possess reality or truth, what we may mean by ‘reality’ or ‘truth’ ties to epistemology (and ultimately, indeed, to ethics).  I resist the grounds that van Fraassen or Cartwright have for being anti-realist, but in quite a different way I establish for myself a measure of sympathy with anti-realism.
^16	 What slogan must a hypothetico-deductivist put in its place?  Presumably something like “To guess a guess which, because it in fact is metaphysically true, passes all our severest tests of it, is to know.”  In my view the slogan “to measure is to know” is quite systematically superior to this other slogan.  I develop below some of my reasons for this view, especially in Section 5.
^17	 Thus I think that so-called hypothetico-deductivists are seriously mistaken in their conception of scientific inquiry.  In this belief I of course follow Jon Dorling, Clark Glymour, and a collection of other contemporary philosophers of science (including DiSalle and Harper, Earman, Gunn, Harper, Harper and Smith, and Norton, in the references), whose ideas I shall briefly discuss below.
^18	 Wisdom involves both broadly moral and more narrowly epistemological aspects.  In its epistemological aspect, wisdom involves, among other things, one’s adopting a middle position between scepticism and dogmatism.  Certainly it is wise to be fallibilist, about just about every thought considered individually; but it is at the same time unwise to carry this fallibilism to sceptical excess, for example by doubting the entire corpus of thought considered all at once.  Anti-inductivist hypothetico-deductivists are ineluctably drawn into a thoroughgoing scepticism, according to which it is possible that the entire corpus of contemporary thought is mistaken.  The so-called problem of induction just is a way of questioning all one’s beliefs at once.  The most measured understanding is, by contrast, never thus sceptical, although, as I demonstrate below, it retains what is appropriate about fallibilism.  The most measured understanding is a wise understanding, in a way that anti-inductivist hypothetico-deductive understanding (also known as critical rationalism, or Popperianism) in my view is not.
^19	 For example: that if two moraines are quite utterly alike in constitution, then they were originally created by a single glacier; that moraines which originally created by a single glacier were created in roughly the same place; that if two things which were once in roughly the same place are far apart from one another, then at least one of them must have moved; and that if a moraine has moved en bloc then the ground underneath it must likewise have moved.
^20	 This was Einstein’s programme of the unified field.
^21	 Harvey Brown led me to see this point.
^22	 See Stachel ([1980] 1989).  Subsequent to Stachel’s 1980 discoveries there has been a substantial literature on Einstein’s “hole argument”, a literature that sets this argument into connection with the supposed “issue of spacetime substantivalism”. I shall deliberately skirt around this literature, since I do not believe that “spacetime substantivalism” ever really was an issue for Newton or Einstein.  For some helpful clarification, see DiSalle (1994).
^23	 Harvey Brown led me to see this point.
^24	 Einstein first articulated this conception at roughly the same time as he wrote the realist-seeming paper ([1920] 1922).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